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ABSTRACT
Students of government finance have ignored to a sur­
prising extent the savings bond program as an instrument of 
debt management in the postwar period. The hypothesis here 
considered is that the role of this program in debt manage­
ment for calendar years 1947-63 depended largely upon the 
responsiveness of the demand for savings bonds to interest 
rate differentials between these bonds and alternative out­
lets for savings and the unwillingness and/or inability of the 
Treasury to maintain the attractiveness of savings bond 
yields.
Accordingly, the investigation was directed first to 
isolating those major variables affecting the demand for 
savings bonds; second, to establishing the apparent extent 
to which the attractiveness of savings bonds depended 
upon relative yields; third, to indicating (quantitatively) 
both the responses of investors to Treasury offerings of 
savings bonds and the importance of savings bonds as a 
component of the national debt; and fourth, to testing of 
those variables affecting the demand for savings bonds for 
significance.
For series of savings bonds which were primarily de­
signed and sold to individuals with small financial means, 
the tests indicate that a few yield differentials between 
savings bonds and marketable government securities are sig­
nificant single determinants of the combined net sales of 
these series during calendar years 1947-63. For series of 
savings bonds which were designed and sold to nonindividual 
and individual investors with substantial financial means, 
the tests indicate that income and several yield differen­
tials between savings bonds and both marketable government 
securities and savings deposits (or shares) In financial 
intermediaries are significant multiple determinants of the 
combined net sales of these series. In essence, these re­
sults indicate that the sensitivity of investors to changes 
in relative yields (1) was greater for investors with large 
financial means than for investors with small means, and (2) 
was greater than that for changes in income.
It was also found that the Treasury was generally un­
willing to maintain the attractiveness of the relative yields 
of savings bonds designed for investors with large means.
The greater interest-rate sensitivity of these investors 
tends to point out the Treasury's rationale for discontinuing 
the sales of these series of bonds early in 1957. The 
restraint applied in maintaining the attractiveness of the
xi
relative yields of those"series designed for investors with 
small means, on the other hand, originated more often from 
a prohibitive, statutory interest rate ceiling. For example, 
in addition to increasing the maturity yields on new issues 
of these series in 1952 and 1957, the Treasury even increased 
the maturity yields on new and outstanding issues in 1959; 
with respect to the latter yield boost, however, more un­
willingness rather than inability limited the increase in 
yields on new and outstanding issues.
This study, however, appears to raise more questions 
than it answers. First, the results of the tests of sig­
nificance of those variables affecting the demand for sav­
ings bonds are promising for a preliminary study, but they 
are not conclusive. Second, an appropriate role for the 
savings bonds program in debt management has not yet been 
defined clearly in the literature.
xii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The savings bond program In the United States has been 
an important instrument of Federal debt management from its 
inception on March 1, 1935 to the present time. Although 
the primary concern of this study is the significance of 
savings bonds in postwar debt management (1947-63), a review 
of the earlier history of the program is also presented in 
order to provide necessary background information.
During the life-span of the program--approximately 
twenty-nine years by the end of calendar year 1963--the 
Treasury sold ten alphabetical series of savings bonds, 
beginning with the original series A and ending with series 
K bonds. All series of savings bonds were identical
Only bonds of series A through D were sold between 
March, 1935 and April, 1941. As a substitute for these 
original offerings of a single series of savings bonds, 
bonds of series E, F, and G were introduced in May, 1941. 
Bonds of series J and K, respectively, were substituted 
for the offerings of bonds of series F and G beginning in 
May, 1952. In June, 1952, series H bonds were introduced. 
After the sales of series J and K bonds were discontinued 
in April, 1957, only bonds of series E and H were sold.
1
2with respect to two features--all were registered and non- 
marketable. In spite of the differences in the terms on 
which they could be redeemed for cash, all savings bonds 
were highly liquid assets. All bonds could be redeemed 
virtually at any time at the discretion of the holder, 
and all could be converted into cash with zero risk of 
capital loss. The great liquidity of savings bonds 
depended partly on their fixed yield structure, i.e., 
the stated and unvarying terms on which -they could be 
redeemed for cash at various times up to and past origi­
nal maturity date.
In attempting to sell nonmarketable savings bonds, 
the Treasury is faced with the following dilemma. In an 
environment in which interest rates are relatively stable, 
a fixed yield structure on savings bonds might enable the 
Treasury to both attract a large number of long-term lenders 
and inhibit redemptions of outstanding bonds prior to ma­
turity, but the cost to the Treasury could be quite high.
The reason for this, of course, is that the Treasury must 
fix the yield structure on its savings bonds at a level 
sufficiently high to insure the attractiveness of these 
securities vis-l-vis competing outlets for funds. In 
general, the Treasury cannot ignore its financing costs 
and is under pressure to minimize them. Even worse, when
3economic conditions are relatively unstable, frequent 
changes in yields on savings bonds are required if the 
Treasury is to attract long-term lenders and inhibit early 
redemptions. Yet, the frequency of changes in yields on non- 
marketable securities are clearly limited by institutional 
restraints.
The environment in which the savings bond program 
operated and the unwillingness and/or the inability of the 
Treasury to maintain the attractiveness of the yield 
structures on these issues largely determined the role of 
savings bonds in Treasury borrowing. Since its inception, 
the savings bond program has not functioned within a uni­
form environment. Significant changes in the core of the 
program, especially with respect to changes in yield struc­
tures, have occurred in response to major environmental 
changes. In this respect, a minimum of three periods 
within the life-span of the program can be distinguished. 
These periods are identified in this study as a period of 
origin (March 1, 1935 to April 30, 1941), an expansionary 
period (May 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946), and a postwar 
period (calendar years 1947-63). However, a division in 
the postwar period appears to have occurred sometime be­
tween the outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 
and the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord on March 4, 1951.
4Consequently, the postwar period is divided into two phases, 
the first stopping at the end of calendar year 1950.
Between the inception of the savings bond program and 
the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord early in 1951, frequent 
changes in yield structures for new issues of savings bonds 
were unnecessary. The economy was characterized by rela- 
tively stable rates of interest on alternative investments. 
The existing yield structure on savings bonds--designed so 
as to provide a higher or "premium" yield on savings bonds 
held to maturity and lower "penalty" rates (relative to the 
maturity yield) on bonds redeemed prior to maturity--was 
effective in attracting long-term lenders and inhibiting 
early redemptions. The relative attractiveness of savings
2
Actually, some modest fluctuations in rates on alter­
native investments did occur, but not nearly of the magni­
tude of post-accord rate movements. Generally low but 
mildly declining rates of interest on alternative invest­
ments existed during the period of origin; therefore, the 
relative attractiveness of savings bond yields progressively 
increased during this period of time. When the monetary 
authorities adopted the policy of supporting the government 
securities market at par during the Second World War, gen­
erally low and rigidly stable rates of interest existed 
on alternative investments. This situation existed through­
out the expansionary period. With the continued, but less 
rigid, support of the government securities market until the 
accord in 1951, some slightly rising rates of interest on 
alternative short-term investments were experienced during 
the first phase of the postwar period. To a small extent, 
therefore, the relative attractiveness of savings bonds 
deteriorated in this period, but only to a mild degree.
5bond yields undoubtedly contributed to the acceptance of 
these issues by investors, but the impetus of patriotism 
must be given considerable credit for the great expansion 
in savings bonds during the Second World War. Throughout 
the period cited, but especially during the war, the savings 
bond program expanded into an important source of net cash
receipts for the Treasury, and thereby allowed it to place
greater reliance on savings bonds in financing budgetary 
deficits.
In the period of origin, the savings bond program pro­
vided the Treasury with $3,489 million of net cash receipts 
as savings bond holdings expanded to $3,647 million by the 
end of the period. The rapid rise in savings bond holdings 
to $49,776 million by the end of the expansionary period 
provided the Treasury with $44,529 million of net cash re­
ceipts. The Treasury also received $4,685 million during
the first phase of the postwar period, as savings bond 
holdings expanded to $58,019 million by the end of 1950.
At this time also, the relative importance of savings bonds 
in Treasury debt management reached its summit, as such 
securities represented 22.6 per cent of the total debt.
After the accord, the economic environment changed to 
one of generally rising, but flexible yields on alternative 
investments. In response to these developments, the
6Treasury raised the structure of yields on certain series of 
savings bonds on three occasions--1952, 1957, and 1959.
These boosts, however, were not of a sufficient magnitude 
and reflected the Inability and/or unwillingness of tl^ e 
Treasury to adapt sufficiently to the changing condition^
In spite of these changes In yields, the savings bond pro 
gram resulted in annual net cash drains for the Treasury fro 
the accord to the end of 1963.
Outstanding savings bonds declined to $48,827 million 
by the end of 1963, and the Treasury experienced a cumulative 
net cash drain of $25,602 million from 1951 to 1963. As a 
percentage of the national debt, holdings of savings bonds 
declined (from 22.6 per catt) to 15.8 per cent. Not only 
was this lack of success significant in itself, but un­
doubtedly broader monetary and debt management policies 
were adversely affected by these developments in the sav­
ings bond program.
Objectives of the Study
The significance of the savings bond program in debt 
management during the postwar period is the primary concern 
of this study. In particular, an attempt is made to iso­
late those major variables affecting the demand for savings 
bonds. For a given time period, the role of savings bonds
7may be evaluated relative to that in a prior period. To 
some extent, of course, this approach is utilized in this 
study. On the other hand, any evaluation of the program for 
a given time period appears to hinge primarily upon the sig­
nificance of savings bonds in total saving and in the alloca­
tion of savings. In this respect, the significance of sav­
ings bonds, particularly during the postwar period, appears 
to depend upon the responsiveness of investors to interest 
rate differentials between savings bonds and alternative 
outlets for savings. Although the significance of savings 
bonds in total saving and in the allocation of savings lies 
generally beyond the scope of this study, the extent to 
which investors were responsive to interest rate differen­
tials is emphasized in evaluating the role of the program 
during the postwar period.
In order to place the postwar situation in proper per­
spective, the earlier history of the program and its objec­
tives are presented first. The savings bond program during 
its lifetime is reviewed with respect to both the extent to 
which the attractiveness of savings bonds depended upon 
relative yields (Chapter II) and the responsiveness of 
investors to savings bonds (Chapter III). The detailed 
coverage is greater for the postwar period, however.
8Predominantly with respect to specific interest rate 
differentials, the attractiveness of savings bonds from the 
investors' point of view is then utilized in transforming 
the orthodox demand for a good into the demand for savings 
bonds (Chapter IV). Perhaps most significant, empirical 
estimates of the demand for savings bonds are then made for 
the postwar period (Chapter V). Finally, the role of the 
savings bond program in Treasury debt management is evalu­
ated in the concluding chapter.
Methodology of the Study 
Each period identified within the life-span of the sav­
ings bond program is considered to be a savings bond "mar­
ket." Since savings bonds are nonmarketable securities, 
the "market" is necessarily an unorthodox one. The seller 
is the Treasury. The buyers are private investors, but in 
the case of savings bonds, eligible purchasers are speci­
fied by the Treasury and certain exclusions are made. No 
secondary market for savings bonds exists as ownership of 
the securities cannot be transferred. However, savings 
bonds are redeemable for cash, with only minor restrictions, 
at either the Treasury or authorized outlets.
In general, the activity in this "market" reflects 
the interaction between the Treasury and investors. The
9actions of the Treasury during a specified time period 
represent, in part, its response to the acceptance of sav­
ings bonds by investors in previous time periods. In­
vestors, on the other hand, respond to the Treasury's offer 
based on the current attractiveness of savings bonds vis-i- 
vis alternative investments.
In an orthodox market, the demand for a good per unit 
of time depends upon its price, prices of substitutes and/or 
complements, income, expectations, and tastes or prefer­
ences. It appears that a similar concept of demand can be 
formulated for savings bonds if the time element for the 
orthodox market is transformed into a time series and the
orthodox determinants are transformed into appropriate
3
determinants for savings bonds.
In adapting financial assets to this framework, proxy 
independent variables must be substituted for the orthodox 
determinants, especially the price determinants. Prices as 
opportunity costs, however, appear to provide the appropriate 
substitutes. In particular, interest rate differentials 
seem appropriate for this purpose.
A similar approach was used by Richard T. Selden in 
an empirical analysis of the demand for money. See Richard 
T. Selden, "Monetary Velocity in the United States," Studies 
in the Quantity Theory of Money. ed. Milton Friedman (Chi­
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 179-257.
10
In this study, the concept of the demand for savings 
bonds is adopted. Moreover, estimates of the demand for 
savings bonds are derived empirically with the tool of 
regression analysis.
CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF THE SAVINGS BOND PROGRAM: TERMS
OF OFFERINGS AND ATTRACTIVENESS TO INVESTORS,
MARCH I, 1935 TO DECEMBER 31, 1963
The history of the savings bond program reflects both 
the actions of the Treasury and the responses of investors. 
In part, changes in the program from one time period to the 
next represent the responses of the Treasury in the current 
period to the acceptance of savings bonds by investors in 
the previous period. In reviewing the program during its 
lifetime, therefore, the interaction between the Treasury 
and investors is emphasized.
The Treasury's activities in each time period are re­
flected primarily by the terms on which savings bonds were 
offered, but also by the objectives of the program as stated 
by Treasury officials. The responses of the investors, of 
course, are reflected solely by the figures for gross sales, 
redemptions, net sales, and changes in outstanding bonds. 
Essentially, the dual aspects of the Treasury's activities 
are utilized in dividing the history of the program into 
two chapters.
11
12
A history of the terms on which savings bonds were of­
fered by the Treasury is presented in this chapter, and the 
objectives of the program, as stated by Treasury officials, 
are presented in Chapter III. The interaction between the 
Treasury and investors is emphasized throughout. In this 
chapter, the probable attractiveness of savings bonds to 
investors and the terms of the Treasury's offerings are dis­
cussed concurrently; in the following chapter, the objec­
tives of the program accompany the actual responses of 
investors in terms of gross sales, redemptions, etc.
Period of Origin. March _1, 1935 to April 30. 1941
During the period of origin the Treasury offered four
alphabetical series of savings bonds, beginning with series
A and ending with series D.^ All series were virtually
2
identical, other than in alphabetical designation, and 
can conveniently be discussed as a unit.
Bonds of series A were sold only during calendar year 
1935; in 1936 only, bonds of series B were sold. Series C 
bonds were sold for two years, 1937 and 1938. For the re­
mainder of the period, only bonds of series D were sold.
«
2
When series D bonds were introduced, their features 
other than alphabetical designation were identical to 
those of series A, B, and C. Beginning April 1, 1940, how­
ever, eligible D bond purchasers were restricted to natural 
persons, namely, individuals; in addition, interest earned 
on D bonds purchased on or after March 1, 1941 was no longer 
granted preferential treatment for Federal income tax pur­
poses.
13
Each, bond in series A-D was a discount-appreciation 
type of government security which was sold at an issue price 
equal to 75 per cent of its maturity value. Interest, gradu­
ated upward semiannually, appreciated the issue price of 
each bond during its term to maturity. Each bond matured 
ten years after the first day of the month in which it was 
purchased. If held to its maturity date, a savings bond 
which was purchased on the first day of a month would appre­
ciate in value at the average rate of 2.90 per cent interest
3
per annum compounded semiannually. Series A-D bonds were both 
registered and nonmarketable. The former feature provided pur­
chasers protection from financial loss in case of theft, loss,
4
or destruction; the latter, from market depreciation of value.
Since all bonds purchased during a calendar month 
were dated as though they had been purchased on the first 
day of the month, savings bonds which were purchased after 
the first of the month would appreciate in value at an aver­
age rate somewhat in excess of 2.90 per cent.
^These features were adopted in order to avoid problems 
similar to those associated with the Liberty bonds of the 
First World War. At that time, individuals were urged to 
purchase Liberty bonds. These bonds, however, were unreg­
istered and marketable. Small and/or unsophisticated in­
vestors soon acquired a dislike for savings bonds possessing 
these features. As negotiable bonds, the Liberty bonds were 
subject to the laws of negotiable instruments, and as mar­
ketable bonds, they were subject to the law of supply and 
demand. As a result, many small and/or unsophisticated 
investors, who had purchased Liberty bonds mainly for 
patriotic reasons, suffered unexpected financial losses due 
to either the laws of negotiable instruments or the law of 
supply and demand.
14
Series A-D bonds were redeemable £or cash prior to 
maturity at redemption values less than the stated maturity 
value. Redemption prior to maturity, however, was permitted 
only after a lapse of sixty days following the first day of 
the month in which the bond was purchased.^ These redemp­
tion values were known in advance by the owner since they 
were published in a schedule attached to each bond. Pre­
arranged redemption values less than the stated maturity
value, of course, are synonymous with prearranged yields
6 —
less than the stated maturity yield. /Tables A-l, A-2,
Since all savings bonds purchased during a month car­
ried the issue date of the first day of that month, savings 
bonds purchased on the last day of any month were redeemable 
roughly one month from the date of purchase.
^Attached to each savings bond was a table including:
(1) a schedule of redemption values at successive (cumu­
lative) half-year, time-holding-periods after the issue date;
(2) a schedule of yields to be realized if redemption oc­
curred at successive (cumulative) half-year, time-holding- 
periods after the issue date; and (3) a schedule of prospec­
tive yields to maturity if the bond were held to maturity 
rather than redeemed prior to maturity at successive (cumu­
lative) half-year, time-holding-periods after the issue date.
A prospective yield to maturity is not a return that 
the holder of a savings bond actually receives. Rather, 
this yield provides information that the holder may use in 
deciding whether to redeem or continue to hold the bond to 
maturity. For example, if the prospective yield to maturity 
exceeds an anticipated yield on a comparable investment, the 
rational decision is to continue to hold the savings bond to 
its maturity date. If the anticipated yield on the alterna­
tive investment is greater, the rational decision is to re­
deem the savings bond in order to acquire the alternative 
asset for a period of time equal to that required for the 
savings bond to reach maturity.
15
and A-3 in Appendix A contain the schedules of redemption 
values and yields on a $100 (maturity value) bond^/7
In order to attract a wide range of purchasers, series 
A-D bonds were offered for sale in denominations of $25,
$50, $100, $500, and $1,000 in maturity value. All types 
of investors were considered eligible purchasers. A limit 
of $10,000 (maturity value) in bond purchases during a cal­
endar year was imposed on all purchasers in order to promote 
a widespread distribution of the ownership of the public 
debt. Interest earned on each bond was made partially tax- 
exempt for Federal income tax purposes.
The offering of savings bonds by the Treasury provided 
investors an alternative financial asset to consider in 
planning their portfolios. The attractiveness of savings 
bonds relative to other assets certainly would vary among 
investors. In evaluating the relative attractiveness of 
savings bonds, however, sophisticated investors probably 
would consider the features of safety, liquidity, and ex-
g
pected yield for a given time-holding-period.
^Henry Murphy, The National Debt In War And Transition 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 35-36.
Q
More technically, it appears reasonable that several 
yields for different time-holding-periods would be con­
sidered in order to allow for contingencies.
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Savings bonds were virtually riskless investments 
since they were devoid of market risks as nonmarketable 
securities, were exposed to minimum credit risks as obliga­
tions of the United States government, and were isolated 
from financial losses as registered bonds. When compared 
to alternative investments, series A-D bonds were rela­
tively attractive in providing Investors a safe outlet for 
savings. The relative safety of savings bonds contributed 
greatly to their attractiveness in a period characterized 
by a general shift to savings media of unquestioned safety 
in reaction to the financial crisis of the early 1930's.
The other feature of savings bonds, especially yield struc­
ture, also contributed to their attractiveness.
The schedule of yields for savings bonds to a large 
extent reflected the pattern of interest rates in the finan­
cial markets. The maturity yield of 2.90 per cent, however, 
placed series A-D bonds in a preferred position relative to
marketable government securities and near moneys offered by
9
financial intermediaries. In fact, for long-term lenders
With a ten-year term to maturity for newly issued 
savings bonds, the use of long-term implies at least ten 
years; on the other hand, short-term refers to any period 
of time less than ten years.
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the maturity yield of savings bonds provided a "premium," 
which became progressively larger during the period of 
origin as rates declined on competitive investments. (See 
Table A-4 in Appendix A.) If savings bonds were redeemed 
prior to maturity, on the other hand, short-term yields did 
not place savings bonds in the same preferred position they 
held on the basis of the maturity yield. In order to attract 
long-term lenders and inhibit early redemptions, the differ­
entials between short-term yields on savingp bonds and yields 
on alternative investments were smaller than the "premium" 
of the maturity yield on savings bonds. Similar to the case 
for the maturity yield, however, the "premium" on short-term 
yields of series A-D bonds became progressively larger dur­
ing the period as rates on alternative investments declined. 
(See Table A-2 in Appendix A for the schedule of yields for 
series A-D bonds; rates of interest on alternative invest­
ments are contained in Table A-4 in Appendix A.)
For long-term lenders who were attracted to series A-D 
bonds by the "premium" of the maturity yield, early redemp­
tions probably were discouraged by redemption yields less
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than the stated maturity yield.^ If savings bonds were 
purchased on the basis of their yields relative to alterna- 
tive investments, the lower yields that savings bonds of­
fered short-term lenders probably discouraged early redemp­
tions to a smaller degree.^
Relative to certain near moneys offered by financial 
intermediaries and to marketable government securities, 
series A-D bonds were less liquid in at least one respect. 
The restriction on early redemption reduced the liquidity of 
savings bonds slightly in comparison with these alternative 
investments. In general, alternative investments did not 
contain a prohibition against conversion into cash at any 
time. On the other hand, savings bonds met all the other 
qualifications of an extremely liquid asset, as mentioned 
earlier.
Alternatively, early redemption probably was dis­
couraged by the high prospective yields to maturity for 
savings bonds at short time-holding-periods after the 
issue date. That is, yield-sensitive long-term lenders 
were locked-in. See Table A-3 in Appendix A for the 
schedule of prospective yields for series A-D bonds.
*^-If short-term lenders were yield insensitive in 
purchasing savings bonds, early redemption likewise would 
be insensitive to prospective yields to maturity. Even for 
yield sensitive short-term lenders, the prospective savings 
bond yields to various future dates prior to the date of 
maturity would be less prohibitive than prospective bond 
yields to maturity.
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In summary, series A-D bonds contained many attractive 
features in comparison with alternative investments. Safety 
of principal and relatively high yields contributed greatly 
to the attractiveness of the bonds. Falling yields on al­
ternative investments during the period progressively in­
creased the attractiveness of savings bonds. The general 
acceptance of savings bonds by investors during these early 
years undoubtedly influenced the Treasury's decision to 
greatly expand the program in the war years.
The Expansionary Period, May 1., 1941 to December 31, 1946
The Treasury expanded the scope of the savings bond pro­
gram early in 1941. Its new offerings of savings bonds re­
flected a basic change in the conception of the program.
As a substitute for the original sale of a single series of 
bonds, the offering of a basket of savings bonds signified 
the Treasury's attempt to tap wider sources of funds by 
tailoring its issues more closely to the needs or prefer­
ences of investors.
The first offering of multiple series of savings bonds 
served as a substitute for the single offering of series D 
bonds. The new offering provided for the sale of: (1)
savings stamps to children and individuals with extremely
limited financial resources; (2) series E bonds to indi­
viduals with small financial resources, but in limited 
amounts to individuals with larger financial resources; and 
(3) series F and G bonds in greater but limited amounts to 
all investors outside the commercial banking system. As 
was their predecessor, all three series were nonmarketable 
and registered securities.
The E bond offering provided the Treasury with a rela­
tively expensive means of attracting long-term funds from a 
difficult source--individuals with small financial resources. 
With a somewhat restrictive limitation imposed on E bond 
purchases, the offering of series F and G bonds at lower 
yields provided the Treasury with a less expensive means of 
borrowing additional funds from individuals with larger 
financial resources, This simultaneous offering of F and 
G bonds to all investors outside the commercial banking sys­
tem provided a broader means, with no change in cost to the 
Treasury, of tapping additional funds.
The new E bonds emerged as series D bonds revised in
As savings stamps were never a significant source 
of funds and are outside the scope of this study, no further 
attention is directed to them.
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only two features. Sharply reduced short-term and inter­
mediate- term redemption values and yields were adopted for 
the new E bonds, and the annual limit on bond purchases was 
reduced.
The schedule of yields for E bonds was designed pri­
marily to discourage early redemption, but possibly also, 
to bring the short- and intermediate-term structure of inter­
est rates more in line with the pattern of interest rates 
that was developing in the financial markets. (See Table 
A-4 in Appendix A.) In comparison to the old D bonds, the 
yield structure on E bonds was sharply reduced for securi­
ties held less than seven years. For time-holding-periods 
of seven years and more, however, the yield structures for 
E and D bonds were identical. (See Tables A-l, A-2, and 
A-3 in Appendix A.) In adopting this schedule of yields 
for E bonds, the Treasury narrowed the relative benefits 
in short- and intermediate-term yields on savings bonds 
compared to alternative investments and enlarged the 
"penalties" for redeeming savings bonds prior to maturity.
13The original offering of E bonds in denominations of 
$25, $50, $100, $500, and $1,000 (maturity value) was iden­
tical to the D bond offering. Later in the period, however, 
offerings of E bonds were expanded; from June, 1941 to March, 
1950, a $10 bond was sold to armed forces personnel and 
beginning in October, 1945, a $200 E bond was offered for 
sale.
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Thus, it appears that E bonds were designed primarily to 
attract long-term lenders who were sensitive to interest 
rates; undoubtedly, the Treasury assumed that short-term 
lenders were yield sensitive also.
Since the substantial "premium" in maturity yield which 
existed for series D bonds was established for the new E 
bonds, the calendar year limit on purchases was reduced 
from $10,000 (maturity value) in D bonds to $5,000 in E 
bonds. In essence, the lower limit reduced the extent to 
which the "premium" in maturity yield was to be paid to 
individuals with large financial resources.
In order to tap additional funds from all investors 
outside the commercial banking system, the Treasury designed 
two new series of savings bonds: a discount-appreciation
bond, series F; and a current-income bond, series G. Bonds 
of both series had a term to maturity of twelve years, be­
ginning the first day of the month in which they were pur­
chased. Graduatedupward semiannually, interest appreciated 
the purchase price of the F bonds; the G bonds, on the other 
hand, provided uniform interest payments semiannually. The 
purchase price of F bonds was 74 per cent of their maturity 
value. If held to maturity, these securities appreciated in 
value at a rate equivalent to 2.53 per cent interest. The 
G bonds, on the other hand, were purchased at par value. If
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held to maturity, current interest payments yielded 2.50 
per cent per annum, a figure virtually identical to that on 
the F bonds.
Sales of both F and G bonds were limited to $50,000
(issue price) during any calendar year; all investors other
than commercial banks were eligible to purchase these se- 
1A
curities. These bonds originally were offered in denomi­
nations of $100, $500, $1,000, and $10,000 (par value); 
sale of $25 F bonds was later authorized.
The condit ions for redeeming F and G bonds were identi­
cal, but were more rigid than that for E bonds. It is to 
be recalled that E bonds were redeemable for cash sixty 
days after issue and without advance notice. By comparison,
F and G bonds were not redeemable until six months after the 
first day of the month in which they were purchased, and were 
redeemable only upon advance notice of sixty days. These 
features rendered F and G bonds somewhat less liquid than 
series E bonds.
Similar to E bonds, early redemption values for F bonds 
were less than the stated maturity value; for G bonds,
1A
It is interesting to note that while F and G bonds 
were normally limited to nonbank purchasers, limited amounts 
of these bonds were purchased by commercial banks in special 
offerings in 19AA and 19A5.
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redemption values prior to maturity were discounted par 
values. The various penalties for early redemptions were 
similar for series F and G bonds, but were more severe than 
those imposed on comparable early redemptions of E bonds.
The level of the schedule of yields (redemption values) for 
F bonds was virtually the same as that for G bonds; however, 
their yields and redemption values were lower than those for 
E bonds. (See Table A-l and A-2 in Appendix A.)
Of particular importance, the yield structure adopted 
for F and G bonds was less attractive than that for E bonds 
when compared to yields on competitive investments. This 
differential in relative yields reflected the Treasury's 
attempt to segregate individuals with small financial re­
sources and reward them at a higher rate than others. The 
generous yields established for E bonds was one of the means 
by which the Treasury hoped to achieve its objective of pro­
moting a widespread ownership of the public debt. One con­
sequence of this differentiation was that the less attrac­
tive yields established for F and G bonds rendered them more 
vulnerable to small increases in the level of interest rates 
on competitive investments. This was not very significant 
during the war period, however, because of the Treasury- 
Federal Reserve's decision to support the prices of market­
able government securities at par. As a result, rates of
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interest on investments competitive with savings bonds were 
effectively stabilized.
The Postwar Period, Calendar Years 1947-63 
A division in the postwar period appears to have oc­
curred sometime between the outbreak of the Korean War in 
the summer of 1950 and the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord 
on March 4, 1951. In this respect, a division of this period 
into two phases may be appropriate, with the end of calendar 
year 1950 marking the division.
During the first phase of the postwar period the 
Treasury continued to offer the same basket of savings bonds 
that was offered during the war. Minor differences con­
sisted of special offerings and a doubling of the annual 
limits on purchases of E, F, and G bonds.^
Some relevant yields for the entire postwar period 
are depicted in Chart 2-1. Various concepts of the returns 
on savings bonds are shown as are the yields on marketable
^ S i m i l a r  to those special offerings in 1944 and 1945, 
commercial banks were permitted to purchase limited amounts 
of F and G bonds in the special offerings of 1948 and 1950. 
Effective March 18, 1948, the annual limit on E bond pur­
chases was increased from $5,000 to $10,000 in maturity 
value; for F and G bonds, the limit was raised to $100,000, 
but between July 1, 1948 and July 15, 1948, to $1,000,000 
for institutional investors.
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Sources and Notes to Chart 2-1
Sources: Yields on new issues of savings bonds for all
years prior to the change in yields in 1959 from Treasury 
Bulletin (May, 1959), p. A-8; for the 1959 change in yields 
and the yields for the years thereafter, ibid. (October, 
1959), p. A-4. Effective rates of return paid to share­
holders in savings and loan associations for the years 
1946-1959 from Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in 
the United States (Princeton, N. J., 1955), Vol. 1, p. 447; 
effective rates of return paid to shareholders in member 
savings and loan associations of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System for years 1950-1953 from Federal Home Loan Board, 
Combined Financial Statements 1953, p. 8; for years 1954-63 
from ibid, 19&3. p. 9. Effective rates of return paid to 
deposit holders in insured mutual savings banks for years 
1946-50 from Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 1950, pp. 274-275; for the years 1951-54, ibid. 
1959. pp. 168-169; for years 1955-63; ibid. 1963. pp. 176- 
177. Effective rates of return paid to time and savings 
deposit holders in insured commercial banks for years 1946- 
50, ibid. 1950. pp. 252-253; for years 1951-54, ibid. 1959, 
pp. 146-147; for years 1955-63, ibid. 1963. pp. 154-155. 
Effective rates of return for Federal- and State-chartered 
credit unions are calculated yields from dividend payments 
and share data; for the year 1947 from U. S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Monthly Labor Review. LXIX (September, 1949),
276; for 1948, ibid.. LXXI (September, 1950), 360; for 1949, 
ibid., LXXIII (November, 1951), 561; for years 1950-51, 
ibid.. LXXVI (February, 1953), 156; for 1952 from U. S,
Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin,
XVI (November, 1953), 13; for 1953, ibid.. XVII (November, 
1954), 18; for 1954, ibid., XVIII (November, 1955), 19; for 
years 1955-56, ibid., XX (November, 1957) 20; for years
1957-58, ibid.. X X W  (November, 1959), 20; for 1959, ibid., 
XXIV (November, 1961), 17; for year 1960-61, ibid., XXV 
(November, 1962), 18; for years 1962-63, ibid.. XXVII (No­
vember, 1964), 17. Effective rates of return paid to deposit 
holders in postal savings are interpolated calendar yields 
from calculated fiscal year deposits and interest payments 
data from 1946-63 from each yearly, U. S. Congress, House 
Document^ Report of Operations of the Postal Savings 
System /year/. Average yields on taxable, marketable 
securities for the years 1946-48 from Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. XXXV (January, 1959), 51; for the years 1949-51,
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ibid., XXXVIII (January, 1952), 60; for the years 1952-54,
ibid.. XLI (January, 1955), 47; for the years 1955-57,
ibid., XLIV (January, 1958), 49 and 84; for the years
1958-60, ibid.. XLVII (January, 1961), 60; for the years
1961-63, ibid.. L (January, 1964), 70.
Note 1. Effective rates of return paid to share or 
deposit holders of a composite near money are calculated, 
weighted averages of rates of return paid by savings and 
loan associations, mutual savings banks, credit unions, 
commercial banks and the postal savings system. The 
weights were respective quantities of deposits or shares 
invested in each savings outlet; see Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, Savings and Home Finaneing Source Book. 1964. 
p. 13.
Note 2. Nominal savings bond yields are not strictly 
comparable with the effective rates of return paid to share 
or deposit holders of the indicated financial intermedi­
aries. To the extent that nominal yields offered by these 
intermediaries exceeded the effective yields paid, the 
yield comparisons shown above overstate the relative yield
attractiveness of each group of savings bonds.
Note 3. In order to simplify the presentation, bond 
yields of series E are indicated only in Chart 2-1-A; 
bond yields of series F or J, only in Chart 2-1-B. In 
order to compare the yields of both groups of bonds to 
both types of competitive rates of interest, the yields 
of both groups of savings bonds must be mentally inter­
changed. In this respect, Chart 2-2 is helpful.
Note 4. Nominal yields for F or J bonds consist 
of yields only for the F bonds until April 30, 1952; 
beginning May 1, 1952, J bonds only. Nominal J bonds 
yields are not indicated for the years after 1957, since 
the sales of these bonds were discontinued.
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government securities and the effective rates paid by 
major financial institutions. These data can be used to 
derive a variety of yield differentials involving both 
series E and series F (later J) savings bonds. Three types 
of yield differentials for each category are shewn in 
Chart 2-2. The first is termed the opportunity cost of 
purchasing a nonmarketable savings bond rather than a 
marketable government security. The importance of this 
terminology will be apparent later when the demand for sav­
ings bonds is tested empirically. It is important to note 
at this point that a negative opportunity cost indicates 
that the yield on savings bonds exceeds that on marketable 
government securities. That is, a negative yield differen­
tial in Chart 2-2-A indicates a "premium" on savings bonds. 
The second yield differential involves the opportunity cost 
of holding a savings bond rather than near moneys offered by 
financial intermediaries. A three year time-holding-period 
is used. Again, a negative yield differential indicates a 
"premium" on savings bonds. The third yield differential 
is termed the opportunity cost of redeeming a savings bond 
in order to purchase a marketable government security. A 
negative yield differential indicates a financial gain is 
expected in redeeming outstanding savings bonds in order to 
purchase an intermediate-term marketable government security.
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Sources and Notes to Chart 2-2 
Sources: Calculated from the data cited in Chart 2-1.
Note to Charts 2-2-A. In order to approximate the 
opportunity cost of purchasing a nonmarketable savings bond 
rather than a marketable government security, at least two 
yield differentials appear appropriate. For long-term 
lenders the differential between the average yield on long­
term (ten years or more) marketable government securities 
and the maturity yield on a savings bond is used; for short­
term lenders, the differential between the average yield on 
short-term (9-12 months) marketable government issues and 
the yield on a savings bond held for one year. A negative 
yield differential indicates that a "premium" is expected in 
purchasing and holding a savings bond.
Note to Charts 2-2-B. In order to approximate the 
opportunity cost of holding a savings bond rather than near 
moneys offered by financial institutions, a single yield 
differential simplifies the numerous comparisons that are 
possible. That is, the differential between the average 
return paid to depositors or shareholders as indicated by 
the composite near money and the yield on a savings bond 
held for three years is used. A negative yield differen­
tial indicates that a "premium" is expected in purchasing 
and holding savings bonds for three years.
Note to Charts 2-2-C. In order to approximate the 
opportunity cost of redeeming a savings bond in order to 
purchase a marketable government security, a single dif­
ferential appears sufficient and appropriate, i.e., the 
differential between the prospective yield to maturity at 
a time-holding-period of five years for E bonds and seven 
years for F or J bonds, and the average yield on inter­
mediate-term (3-5 years) marketable government obligations.
A negative yield differential indicates that a financial 
gain is expected in redeeming savings bonds in order to 
purchase the intermediate-term government security.
As can be seen in Charts 2-1 and 2-2, the yield at­
tractiveness of new issues of savings bonds during the first 
phase of the postwar period began to deteriorate somewhat
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when compared to the yields on marketable government 
securities and, to a greater extent, when compared to 
those on near moneys offered by financial intermediaries. 
(That is, the opportunity costs of purchasing and holding 
savings bonds increased.) The deterioration occurred not 
only in the attractiveness of the yields on new savings 
bonds, but also in the attractiveness of the prospective 
yields to maturity on outstanding savings bonds. In the 
former case, purchases of savings bonds became less desir­
able; in the latter, early redemption became more attrac­
tive as the opportunity cost of redeeming savings bonds 
declined.
Actually, the "premium" of the maturity yield for 
savings bonds, i.e., the yield in excess of the average 
yield on long-term marketable government bonds, changed 
relatively little as the rigid support of the government 
bond market continued. However, as the Federal Reserve's 
support of short-term government security prices became 
somewhat less rigid, the market yields on these issues 
increased slightly. Thus, the increases in the opportunity 
costs of purchasing and holding savings bonds affected 
short-term rather than long-term lenders. Likewise, it 
became less costly to redeem savings bonds and purchase 
alternative assets. Similarly, the attractiveness of
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savings bonds also deteriorated in comparison to near 
moneys offered by financial intermediaries, especially 
shares offered by insured credit unions.
The changes which occurred from 1947 to 1950 were 
minor, however, in comparison to the more drastic develop­
ments in the second phase of the postwar period. Following 
the accord in 1951, interest rates on competitive invest­
ments exhibited cyclical fluctuations around a rising trend. 
As a result of the rising interest rates, the Treasury made 
significant changes in their offerings of savings bonds in 
1952, 1957, and 1959. Each change represented an attempt to
restore, in part, the attractiveness of the yields on savings 
16
bonds.
The first new basket of savings bonds following the 
accord contained a revised series E bond, the replacement
The beginning of the second phase of the postwar 
period roughly coincided with the period in which the E 
bonds sold during the war began to mature. Therefore, even 
prior to the first major change in the post-accord savings 
bond program, the Treasury had modified the program in order 
to avoid a continuing cash drain from redemptions of E bonds 
at maturity. The holders of E bonds maturing on or after 
May 1, 1951 were offered three options.
Option 1 offered holders cash payment at maturity, as 
originally contracted. Option 2 offered holders an auto­
matic extension of an additional term to maturity of ten 
years. During the first seven and one-half years after the 
original date of maturity, the matured E bonds outstanding 
would appreciate in value at a rate of 2.50 per cent (simple) 
interest per year; for the remainder of the extended term,
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of F and G bonds with J and K bonds, and a new series H 
bond. In addition to the new series, the primary differ­
ence in these offerings involved a change in yield struc­
tures for new issues.^
A higher schedule of yields was adopted for new issues 
of E bonds in order to increase their yields relative to 
financial intermediary claims and, possibly to some extent, 
to adjust to the evolving yield curve for marketable govern­
ment securities. The maturity yield of new E bonds was 
increased from 2.90 per cent to the statutory ceiling of 
3.0 per cent; while this increase was granted, however, the 
original term to maturity was reduced from ten years to nine 
years, eight months. In addition, the wide spread between 
shorter term yields on savings bonds and their maturity
matured E bonds outstanding would appreciate in value in 
order to yield 2.90 per cent interest per annum compounded 
semiannually by the end of the extended term to maturity. 
Option 3 offered holders an exchange of their E bonds for 
current-income G bonds. Since these G bonds were redeem­
able on a calendar month's notice, at par value, they were 
different from the series G bonds obtained by direct pur­
chase.
For more details about these options, see Treasury 
Bulletin (April, 1951), pp. A-l and A-2.
^Series E, F, and G bonds were introduced on May 1, 
1952; series H bonds were offered for sale beginning June 1, 
1952.
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yield was reduced significantly, even more than the 
maturity yield was (could be) increased. But, of course, 
the new yield structure still provided a penalty for early 
redemption, although a smaller penalty than previously. 
(See Chart A-l in Appendix A.)
New issues of E bonds also provided for an optional 
extended term to maturity of ten years. During the second 
ten year period, the original maturity value would appre­
ciate in value in order to yield at extended maturity 3.0
18
per cent interest. New issues of E bonds also differed
^®The original schedules of redemption values and 
yields on E bonds outstanding prior to May 1, 1952, were 
not revised. Similar schedules for the extended term to 
maturity, however, were revised for some of these bonds. 
Upon maturity, E bonds bearing an original issue date from 
May 1, 1942 through April 1, 1952 could be held for a ten- 
year, extended term yielding 2.95 per cent; however, upon 
maturity, E bonds bearing an original issue date from May 
1, 1941 through April 1942 could be held only for the ex­
tended term that was granted as an option earlier in 1951. 
(See footnote 16.)
In cases where the maturing E bond was not held for 
the optional extended term, holders were granted two op­
tions. The first was for the holders to accept a cash pay­
ment at the first maturity date, as originally contracted. 
The second option was for holders to exchange, at maturity, 
the E bond for the new series K current-income bond. The 
conditions under which these exchanges could be made were 
similar to those previously granted in exchanges of E bonds 
for G bonds.
For additional details, see Treasury Bulletin (May, 
1952), pp. A-l through A-9.
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from the original offerings in that the annual limit on 
purchases was doubled to $20,000 in maturity value.
The new J and K bonds were designed as substitutes for 
series F and G bonds, respectively. Many of the basic fea­
tures of these bonds, therefore, were similar to those of 
their predecessors. The only differences involved certain 
changes designed to enhance the attractiveness of the new 
series.
The J and K bonds were made slightly more liquid than 
their predecessors in that the advance notice of sixty days 
for early redemption of F and G bonds was reduced to a cal­
endar month. However, the stipulation that these securities 
could not be redeemed until six months after issue date was 
not changed.
The level and structure of yields for J and K bonds 
were modified also. Even though greater leeway existed 
under the statutory interest rate ceiling (3.0 per cent), 
the Treasury increased the maturity yields of both series 
to only 2.76 per cent. Perhaps this represented the 
Treasury's concern with holding interest costs on the 
national debt to a minimum. While maturity yields were 
raised, the original term to maturity of twelve years for 
F and G bonds was kept intact. A significant reduction in 
the spread between shorter term yields and the maturity
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yielc also took place. (See Chart A-l in Appendix A.) In 
fact, the changes in the yield structure on J and K bonds 
were even more pronounced than that on E bonds.
The calendar year limit on J and K bond purchases was 
doubled to $200,000 (issue price), similar to that for E 
bonds. However, unlike E bonds, no extended term to maturity 
was offered either to purchasers of series J and K bonds or 
to holders of the outstanding F and G bonds. In all other 
features, J and K bonds were identical to those of F and G 
bonds. As with their predecessors, series J and K bonds were 
equally attractive in terms of yields and liquidity.
In comparing the revised series E bonds with the new 
J and K issues, it is clear that the former retained their 
greater attractiveness in terms of yields and liquidity.
The yields of new E bonds were greater than those for J and 
K bonds, as indicated in Charts 2-1 and 2-2; because of the 
necessary month's notice before redeeming J and K bonds and 
the longer period after the issue date before these issues 
were eligible for redemption, new E bonds were more liquid-
After considerable popularity of the current-income
19
G bond had been demonstrated, the new series H bond was
19Purchases of G bonds exceeded those of F bonds at 
all times.
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also designed to pay interest to individuals on the same 
basis. Actually, the features of series H bonds were in 
some respects a hybrid of those of both series E and G 
bonds. Series H bonds were different from G bonds (and
similar to E bonds) in that interest was graduated upward
semiannually over their term to maturity. When redemption 
was not restricted, H bonds were always redeemable at par 
value, whereas G bonds (E bonds) were redeemable at dis­
counts from par value (maturity value) prior to maturity.
Identical to new E bonds, series H bonds yielded 3.0 
per cent interest per annum at the end of the term to ma­
turity of nine years eight months. In addition, the yield 
structures for the semiannual interest payments to the 
holders of H bonds and the appreciation of value to the
holders of E bonds were similar. Series H bonds had
restrictions on early redemption identical to those for 
series J and K bonds. Thus, they were redeemable for cash 
prior to maturity six months after the first day of the 
month in which they were purchased, but only on one calendar 
month's notice. The new E bond calendar year limit on pur­
chases of $20,000 was adopted for H bonds. In contrast to 
the new E bonds, H bonds were offered only in denominations 
of $500, $1,000, $5,000, and $10,000 par value in order to 
avoid the payment of interest in excessively small amounts.
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No optional extended term to maturity was offered to the 
holders of H bonds.
In summary, the relative yields of series H bonds 
were approximately equal to those of new E bonds (Charts 
2-1 and 2-2). However, H bonds--like J and K bonds--were 
slightly less liquid than new E bonds because of the longer 
restricted redemption period after the issue date and the 
month's notice required in redeeming these bonds prior to 
maturity.
The Federal Reserve moved toward a more restrictive 
monetary policy following the 1952 revision in yields on 
savings bonds. The changes in yield structures, therefore, 
only temporarily increased the relative attractiveness of 
new savings bonds when compared to marketable government 
securities and near moneys offered by financial intermedi­
aries. The rapid rise in the level of interest rates on 
these competitive investments soon eliminated the temporary 
gains for new savings bonds (Charts 2-1 and 2-2).
20Later in this study the various series of savings 
bonds offered during the postwar period are combined into 
two groups. Group 1 consists of series E initially, but 
series E and H beginning in 1952. Group II consists of F 
and G bonds initially, but series F, G, J, and K bonds be­
ginning in 1952.
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The decline in the level of interest rates of market­
able government securities during the 1953-54 recession 
significantly enhanced the relative yields of all savings 
bonds. With respect to near moneys offered by financial 
intermediaries, the recession at least reduced the rapid 
rate at which the relative attractiveness of savings bonds 
had been deteriorating.
After the 1953-54 recession, interest rates on competi­
tive investments rose above the level that had been reached 
prior to the recession. The result, of course, was a fur­
ther deterioration in the relative yields of savings bonds 
by 1957. Certainly, the changing yield differentials were 
unfavorable for all series of bonds, but generally more so 
for J and K bonds than for the higher yielding E and H bonds. 
According to the terminology adopted earlier, the opportunity 
costs of purchasing and holding savings bonds rose sharply, 
while the cost of redeeming savings bonds declined sharply. 
(See Charts 2-1 and 2-2.)
Even though the attractiveness of savings bond yields 
was deteriorating, the maturity yield for series E and H 
bonds could not be increased without a change in the statu­
tory interest rate ceiling which had existed since 1935.
The time needed to obtain this change (from 3.00 to 3.26 
per cent) delayed the introduction of a new basket of E and
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H bonds until 1957. The situation with J and K bonds was 
considered even more critical. Because of the greater 
sensitivity to interest rates among purchasers of J and K 
bonds, the Treasury was led to discontinue the offerings of 
these bonds. This brought to a close the Treasury's experi­
mentation with nonmarketable savings bonds designed for in­
vestors of substantial means.
The new offerings of E and H bonds in 1957 possessed 
ratios of purchase price to maturity value identical to 
those which were adopted for the original discount- 
appreciation and current-income bonds. Jn general, however, 
the changes in the offerings of E and H bonds in 1957 were 
similar to those made for E bonds in 1952, i.e., the ma­
turity yield was increased and the spread between shorter 
term yields and the maturity yield was reduced. The magni­
tude of the change, on the other hand, differed.
The term to maturity of new issues of E bonds was 
reduced to eight years eleven months; in addition, the 
maturity yield was increased to 3.25 per cent. This in­
crease of 0.25 percentage points in maturity yield was 
larger than the 1952 increase by 0.15 percentage points; 
however, the actual increase granted was probably less than 
the increase the Treasury would have allowed had Congress 
granted its request to increase the statutory interest rate
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ceiling to 4.25 per cent. Since Congress set the interest
rate ceiling much lower at 3.26 per cent, significantly
larger increases in short- and intermediate-term yields
were set by the Treasury in order to compensate for their
21
lack of leeway in increasing the maturity yield. (See 
Chart A-l in Appendix A.)
Yield changes similar to those for new E bonds were 
adopted for the revised H bonds. In contrast to the change 
for the new E bonds, the term to maturity for H bonds was 
increased to ten years while the maturity yield was in­
creased to the same rate as for E bonds, 3.25 per cent.
With the higher maturity yield for E and H bonds, the cal­
endar year limit on purchases was reduced to $10,000
Several differences in the 1952 and 1957 changes 
are noteworthy. The relative increases in yields at 
time-holding-periods of less than three years were smaller 
than those in 1952; a continued attempt to discourage 
early redemption probably prohibited any larger increases 
in these yields. The yield at a time-holding-period of 
three but less than three and one-half years was increased 
to 2.90 per cent, the level of the maturity yield of series 
A-D and series E bonds prior to 1952. For the range of 
time-holding-periods of three years to the date of maturity, 
the corresponding range in yields for E bonds progressively 
increased from 2.90 per cent to 3.25 per cent. These higher 
yields contrasted sharply with the 1952 interest rate struc­
ture, which went from 2.25 per cent to 3.00 per cent. See 
Chart A-l in Appendix A.
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(maturity value) for each series. No change was made in the 
original or the extended terms to maturity on E bonds out* 
standing prior to February 1, 1957. No extended term to 
maturity option was granted to H bondholders.
The 1957-58 recession was even more significant than 
the 1957 revision in the yield structure in enhancing tem­
porarily the relative yields of new issues of E and H bonds. 
These increases in yields on savings bonds relative to those 
on alternative investments were only temporary, however. In 
part this was due to the shortness of the recession. The 
restrictive monetary policy that was pursued following the 
recession rapidly tightened the financial markets, and the 
level of interest rates on marketable government securities 
soared to a new postwar peak; yields on near moneys offered 
by financial intermediaries also rose rapidly. In fact, the 
relative yields of E and H bonds were reduced by more than 
they had been increased earlier by the 1957 revision in 
yield structure and the 1957-58 recession. Therefore, a 
third basket of savings bonds was required by 1959.
In that year, Congress reluctantly changed the statu­
tory interest rate ceiling above the 3.26 per cent ceiling 
set in 1957. While Increasing the interest rate ceiling 
by 0.99 percentage points to a maximum rate of 4.25 per
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cent, the authority to Increase interest rates up to this 
maximum was again granted to the President, for use at his 
discretion. This increase in the statutory ceiling was 
significantly greater than the increase of 0.26 percentage 
points granted in 1957 and thereby provided greater flexi­
bility in the Treasury's operations.
On June 1, 1959, the third basket of savings bonds
22
since the accord was introduced. Insofar as the interest 
yields were increased for new issues of E and H bonds, this 
offering was similar to the 1957 offering. However, since 
the yields for both series were increased also on outstand­
ing savings bonds, this offering was unprecedented. This 
important change represented an attempt by the Treasury to 
reduce the opportunity cost of redeeming outstanding savings 
bonds and thereby avoid or reduce future cash drains and re­
financings.
The maturity yield for new issues of E and H bonds 
was increased to 3.75 per cent. This increase of 0.50 per­
centage points was substantially larger than the earlier
22
In 1958 the list of eligible purchasers of E and H 
bonds was modified to include all investors other than 
commercial banks; at this time also, maturing F and G 
bonds were made exchangeable for E and H bonds without 
regard to the annual limitations imposed upon purchases 
of these bonds.
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increases in 1952 and 1957. The increase in the maturity 
yield of new issues of E bonds was accomplished by further 
reducing the term to maturity to seven years nine months-- 
the shortest ever. With more leeway in increasing the matur­
ity yield than it had enjoyed in 1957, the Treasury widened 
the spread between the shorter term yields and the maturity 
yield in order to discourage early redemption. (See Chart 
A-l in Appendix A.) It may be recalled that this spread had 
been reduced significantly in 1957.
Outstanding E bonds with issue dates from Hay 1, 1942 
through May 1, 1949 were given their second ten-year ex­
tended term to maturity option. All other outstanding E
bonds as well as new E bonds were granted a single ten-year
23extended term to maturity option.
As with the preceding recession, the 1960-61 recession 
had a substantial effect in reducing the yields on alterna­
tive investments relative to those on new issues of E and H 
bonds. On the other hand, the less rapid rise in the level 
of interest rates after the 1960-61 recession did not vitiate
23For changes in yields on E and H bonds outstanding, 
see Treasury Bulletin (October, 1959), pp. A-2 through A-4; 
ibid., (December, 1959), pp. A-4 through A-20.
In 1961, H bond holders were granted the option of an 
extended term; see Treasury Bulletin (September, 1961), p.
A-3 for this announcement, and ibid., (October, 1961), pp.
A-3 through A-6, for the published schedules of redemption 
values and yields.
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as rapidly these yield differentials. However, by the 
end of the postwar period the relative yields on E and H 
bonds were deteriorating moderately as the level of inter­
est rates on competitive investments gradually increased. 
(See Charts 2-1 and 2-2.)
The Grouping of Postwar Savings Bonds into Two Categories
A major purpose of this study, as indicated earlier, 
is to analyze the demand for savings bonds in the postwar 
period. This is done in Chapters IV and V. Because of the 
complexities presented by the large number of individual 
series, it seems desirable to combine these series into a 
smaller number of groups in order to facilitate the later 
testing of empirical demand functions.
It is possible, of course, to combine series E, F, G, 
H, J, and K bonds into a single group. All savings bonds 
were similar in that they were registered, nonmarketable 
obligations of the United States government, and provided 
their purchasers an equally safe outlet for savings. All 
were designed to attract long-term funds primarily, and 
thus offered higher yields the longer they were held. 
Generally, all savings bonds were very liquid assets also. 
At the option of their owners, with little or no notice, 
they were all redeemable for cash virtually at any time
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prior to maturity. Redemption values and yields for 
specified time-holding-periods, too, were known in ad­
vance. Finally, all savings bonds were offered for sale 
to specified types of investors, subject to maximum limits 
on calendar year purchases.
For regression analysis, however, several problems 
arise in considering all savings bonds as a single homo­
geneous good. First, not all series were offered continu­
ously during the postwar period. At various times as many 
as four and as few as two series were offered concurrently. 
Thus, the number (and kinds) of choices available to would- 
be purchasers varied considerably. More important, perhaps, 
the bonds were subject to significant individual differences 
that suggest combining them into at least two groups.
In this study the decision was made to combine series 
E and H bonds into group I and series F, G, J, and K bonds 
into group II, This grouping corresponds to the Treasury's 
attempt to segregate the market for savings bonds into one
for individual investors and another for nonindividual and
24
individual investors of substantial means. While the 
24Efforts to segregate markets along these lines were 
abandoned in 1957 with the discontinuance of J and K bonds. 
In 1958, too, series E and H bonds were made available on 
the same terms to all nonbank investors, although purchase 
ceilings continued to place a limit on sales to large in­
vestors.
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various series within each group are similar in most funda­
mental respects, these two groups of bonds appear reasonably 
differentiated from one another.
The differentiation between group I and group II bonds
existed in several significant respects. First, group I
25bonds were offered only to individuals prior to 1958,
while group II bonds were always available to all investors
26other than commercial banks until series J and K bonds 
were discontinued early in 1957. Second, the structure of 
yields--both the maturity yield and those for shorter holding 
periods--was consistently higher on group I bonds. Third, 
yearly purchase quotas were considerably lower for the 
first group. Fourth, small denominations have been much 
more important in E bond sales, which account for the bulk 
of group I sales, According to data by George Hanc (repro­
duced as Table 2-1), 58 per cent of the dollar amounts of 
group I sales from May, 1941 to June, 1958 were in denomi­
nations of $100 or less, as compared to only 2 per cent
25Until 1954, series E and H bonds were sold only to 
"natural persons." In that year, employee savings plans 
were added for E bonds only, and both series were made 
available to personal trust estates in 1955.
26Commercial banks, which were normally excluded from 
purchasing savings bonds, were permitted to buy series F 
and G bonds in special offerings in 1948 and in 1950.
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TABLE 2-1.--Distribution of Cumulative Savings Bond Sales, 
by Series, by Denomination of Bond, May 1941-June 1958
Denomination 
(Maturity value 
in dollars)
Percentage of dollar amounts 
(Issue price)
Cumulative
percentages
E & F & J<b> G & E & H
10 d _ - _ _ d
25 27 d — 27
50 13 — 40
100 18 2 2 58
200 2 — 60
500 12 4 6 72
1,000 26 22 28 98
5,000 1 18 18 99
10,000 1 51 44 100
100,000 3 2 100
All denomi­
nations 100 100 100 100
Source: George Hanc, 0£. cit., p. 45.
(a) Series H bonds have been available only in denomi­
nations ranging from $500 to $10,000. Series E 
bonds were sold in $10 denominations to armed 
forces personnel from June, 1941 through March, 
1950. Series E bonds were sold in $200 denomina­
tions for the first time in October, 1945. Sales 
of $10,000 E bonds were authorized May 1, 1952.
E bonds in denominations of $100,000 were issued 
to trustees of employee savings plans and in re­
issue transactions.
(b) Sales of $25 F bonds were authorized in December, 
1941. Data on $100,000 denominations are series J 
bonds.
(c) Figures on $100 bonds refer to series G bonds, 
while those of $100,000 are for series K bonds.
(d) Less than 0.5 per cent.
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for group II. Some 72 per cent of combined sales of F and
J bonds and 64 per cent of combined G and K bonds were in
denominations of $5,000 or more; the comparable figure for
27group I was 2 per cent. To the extent that denomination 
of bond reflects the purchaser's wealth and/or income--as 
must surely be the case to some degree--group I bonds have 
been sold to a less affluent purchaser.
Furthermore, several additional distinguishing fea­
tures can be implied largely because of the dominance of 
series E bonds in group I. Series E bonds were slightly 
more liquid than all other series because of their more 
liberal redemption features. These securities were con­
vertible into cash at any time after an initial two-month 
waiting period; all other series were redeemable only 
after a six month waiting period and on either one- or two
27George Hanc's data also indicate that bond pur­
chases in denominations of $500 or more were approximately 
98 per cent of the group II bonds purchased, but only 40 
per cent of the group I bonds purchased. Separate analysis 
of these two groups of bonds during the period cited--May, 
1941 to June, 1958--would provide for a bond-denomination- 
range parameter of perhaps $500 or more for group II and 
$25 to $1,000 for group I.
Although similar information is not available for 
calendar years 1947-63, reference is later made to a bond- 
denomination-range parameter for the separate analysis of 
groups I and II during the postwar period. Of course, the 
parameter utilized is $500 or more for group II and $25 to 
$1,000 for group I.
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month's notice. Savings bonds were either current-income 
bonds, which were sold at par and paid current interest , or 
discount-appreciation bonds, which were sold at discount and 
appreciated in value. Actually, there is an apparent over­
lap in this respect for the two groups since series E, F, 
and J were discount-appreciation bonds and series C, H s and 
K were current-income securities; however, in dollar amounts, 
series E has dominated group I sales while G bonds during
the years in which series F and G were sold, and presumably
28
G and K bonds from 1947 to 1957, were dominant in group 11.
28Annual gross sales data for each series of bonds are 
available for F and G bends, but not for J and K bonds. 
Nevertheless, the dominance of the gross sales of group II 
bonds by those of series G during the years in which F and 
G bonds were sold is so pronounced, there is no reason to 
believe that the gross sales of group II bonds were not 
also dominated by those of series K during the years in 
which J and K bonds were offered for sale. In this respect, 
total gross sales of group II bonds for the years in which 
series J and K were sold does not appear to be large enough 
to believe that the gross sales of F and J bonds from 1947 
to 1957 could possibly have exceeded those of series K from 
1952 to 1957.
CHAPTER III
THE HISTORY OF THE SAVINGS BOND PROGRAM:
TREASURY OBJECTIVES AND INVESTOR RESPONSE,
MARCH 1, 1935 TO DECEMBER 31, 1963
This chapter completes the history of the savings bond 
program. Primarily, investors' responses in terms of gross 
sales, redemptions, net sales, and changes in outstanding 
bonds are emphasized.
Treasury Objectives 
Economic stabilization was not considered in generally 
accepted principles of debt management prior to the Keynesian 
impact on economic policies. A "sound" debt management 
policy in 1935 was thought to involve a funding of the debt 
Short-term or floating debt was not looked upon with favor. 
Excessive reliance on short-term debt was more likely to 
expose the Treasury to the mercy of the market, since the 
Treasury would face more holders of maturing debt at any one 
time. A longer debt, on the other hand, would not tie the 
Treasury so closely to the market; in this case, refinan­
cings could be smaller. Long-term debt could more easily be
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adapted to plans for debt retirement, which was likewise 
considered to be a worthy endeavor. In general, debt 
retirement
"...was Judged to strengthen the national credit, 
to facilitate further borrowing should the need 
arise, and to increase the capital available for 
industrial growth. Debt reduction increased con­
fidence and gave a favorable tone to^government 
finance."1
Debt retirement and refinancing at lower rates would also 
keep the interest burden of the debt to a minimum.
Not surprisingly, the original objectives of the sav­
ings bond program were similarly unrelated to cyclical 
fluctuations. According to Henry Murphy:
"Secretary Morgenthau's original purpose in requesting 
authorization for the issuance of savings bonds was to 
encourage individual thrift and to secure a widespread 
distribution of the ownership of the public debt. By 
this means he hoped to give a greater number of indi­
vidual citizens a direct financial stake in Federal 
finances and in conservation of the purchasing power 
of money and of property values in general."2
These major objectives--the encouragement of thrift,
with its anti-inflationary Implications, and the promotion
of a widespread distribution of the ownership of the debt, so
as to increase the individual's stake in and knowledge
^■William E, Laird, "The Changing Views on Debt Manage­
ment," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business, III 
(Autumn, 1963),p. 8.
2
Henry Murphy, The National Debt In War And Transition 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 35.
54
of government finances--have remained continuing concerns 
of the program since its inception. Also of continuing im­
portance has been the view that a proper function of the 
Government is to provide the small, unsophisticated investor 
with an absolutely safe outlet for his funds. This concern 
was reflected in the Treasury's decision to issue securities 
which are nonmarketable, redeemable at fixed prices, regis­
tered, and available continuously in small denominations at 
a large number of sales outlets.
The main impetus to the program came with the Second 
World War. Not only was the Treasury faced with raising 
unprecedented amounts of funds, but the impelling need was 
to finance the war in the least inflationary manner possible. 
In this regard, the sale of savings bonds was considered 
anti-inflationary in two respects--savings bond sales di­
rectly encouraged thrift (decreased consumption expenditures) 
and indirectly avoided the need to borrow from commercial 
banks. With the end of the hostilities, the program was 
still considered anti-inflationary in both respects Or 
better yet, "... funds obtained from the sale of savings 
bonds were available for the retirement of bank-held debt,
O
thereby reducing the money supply to that extent." The
a
Statement by John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, 
in A Compendium of Materials on Monetary, Credit, and Fiscal
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money supply argument was repeated frequently throughout the
postwar period, seemingly long after it had lost whatever
4
measure of validity it might once have possessed.
Even before the end of the Second World War at least one 
academic economist, Henry Simons,^ began to discuss debt 
management in relation to economic stabilization. Since that 
time, the pre-Keynesian "sound” debt management policy has 
become less appealing. Although there is now much disagree­
ment as to what constitutes a sound policy, three positions, 
with some divergence of viewpoints within each category, 
have emerged from the postwar debt management controversy.
In retrospect, Simons, the Committee for Economic Development,
7 8 9Rolph, Culbertson, and Beard provided the countercyclical
Policies. Joint Committee on the Economic Report, S. Doc.
132, 81st Cong.; 2nd Sess., 1950, p. 8.
^See, for example, Thomas R. Beard, "Debt Management 
and the Money Supply," Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth 
Annua1 Conference of the National Tax Association. 1965. 
pp. 58-73.
^Henry Simons, "On Debt Policy," Journal of Political 
Economy. LII (December, 1944), pp. 356-61.
^Committee for Economic Development, Managing The Federal 
Debt (New York: 1954), pp. 1-38.
^Earl Rolph, "Principles of Debt Management," American 
Economic Review. XLVII (June, 1957), pp. 302-320.
8j. M. Culbertson, "A Positive Debt Management Program," 
The Review of Economics and Statistics. XLI (May, 1959), pp. 
89-98.
9
Thomas R. Beard, "Counter-Cyclical Debt Management--A 
Suggested Interpretation." Southern Economic Journal. XXX 
(January, 1964), pp. 244-252.
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framework. The neutral doctrine was developed by Friedman
11 12 
and Gaines. To a large extent, Treasury officials and
13Smith held that debt management had little to contribute 
to economic stabilization.
In practice, the Treasury's debt management operations 
in marketable instruments throughout the postwar period were 
generally procyclical. Beginning in the later 1950's, the 
Treasury's policy came under increasing criticism by advo­
cates of countercyclical debt management. A countercyclical 
debt management policy was viewed as an important supplement 
to, but not a substitute for, conventional monetary and fis­
cal policies. In achieving the goal of economic stabiliza­
tion, the alleged high interest cost of employing a counter­
cyclical program was not judged to be a valid deterrent to
Milton Friedman, A Program For Monetary Stability 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1959), especially
pp. 52-76.
^T. C. Gaines, Techniques of Treasury Debt Management 
(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), especially pp.
272-276.
12See, for example, U. S., Congress, Joint Economic 
Committee, Employment, Growth. and Price Levels, Part 6C, 
"The Government's Management of Its Monetary, Fiscal, and 
Debt Operations," 86th Cong. , 1st Sess. , 1959.
^Warren Smith, Debt Management in the United States, 
Study Paper 19 for the Joint Economic Committee in connec­
tion with the "Study of Employment, Growth, and Price 
Levels," 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1960.
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its use. Furthermore, debt management operations aimed at 
minimizing interest costs would have a decidedly procyclical 
impact on the economy, since the sale of longer-term securi­
ties during periods of recession and shorter-term issues 
during periods of prosperity would restrict liquidity in the 
former periods and increase liquidity in the latter.
On the other hand, the savings bond program was
neglected to a surprising extent by students of government 
finance.^ The size of the program in comparison to that of
marketable debt held by the public evidently explains the
brief coverage given to it in the literature. That this 
approach was also followed by the advocates of countercycli­
cal debt management is even more surprising since the post­
war operations of the program undoubtedly had an important 
liquidity impact on the economy, too.'
Numerous questions, infrequently posed and seldom 
answered in the literature, arise in regard to the appro­
priateness of the formulation and implementation of a counter­
cyclical savings bond program. Providing answers for these 
questions, however, lies beyond the scope of this study.
The questions are nevertheless posed at this time. First,
^One notable exception is the study by George Hanc,
The United States Savings Bond Program In The Postwar Period 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,
1962).
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what is the liquidity of savings bonds when advance notice 
for redemption prior to maturity and restricted redemption 
immediately after the purchase date are considered? Second, 
what liquidity position do savings bonds command in relation 
to short- and long-term marketable government securities? 
Third, if savings bonds vis-A-vis marketable government se­
curities are more likely to be purchased and held by indi­
viduals, is a countercyclical savings bond program required 
in addition to a countercyclical management of the marketable 
debt held by the public? Fourth, given a statutory interest 
rate ceiling and an economic environment which is relatively 
unstable, can sufficiently high interest rates on savings 
bonds be adopted to encourage (inhibit) the sale (redemptions) 
of savings bonds during periods of prosperity? Fifth, given 
that the statutory interest rate ceiling is not prohibitive, 
are institutional restraints too formidable to permit fre­
quent increases in yields on nonmarketable savings bonds as 
may be required when economic conditions are relatively un­
stable? Sixth, what is the efficacy of a temporary cessation 
of the sale of savings bonds during periods of recession?
And finally, how can redemptions of savings bonds be encour­
aged during recessions since the opportunity costs of holding 
savings bonds decline during these periods?
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On one hand, the efficacy of a temporary cessation of
the sale of savings bonds during recessions has been denied
by Treasury officials. In 1958, for example, Secretary of
the Treasury Anderson argued,
"The habit of thrift is not something to be encouraged 
at one time and discouraged at another. It is too 
basic, /and he added7 as a matter of fact, the pre­
sent economic downturn is the aftermath of an infla­
tionary boom which would have been much milder had 
Americans saved more than they did in recent years."
On the other hand, Bunting--in his proposal that the powers 
and responsibilities of the Federal Reserve be increased to 
include all aspects of debt management--suggested that sav­
ings bonds should be made marketable and redeemable only at 
maturity. He further suggested that in
"...this less attractive form these bonds would prob­
ably be less widely held; but to the extent they 
remained in the hands of private individuals, they 
could become an especially effective means of in­
creasing aggregate liquidity when deflation threatened 
For if, on the average, $5 billion were to come to 
maturity per year, the monetary authority could refund 
by selling bonds to a Federal Reserve Bank and thereby 
inject new media directly past 'the financial community' 
into the balances of citizens."16
15"share in America," address at the savings bond 
campaign in New York City, April 7, 1958, reprinted in 
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1958. pp. 
262-265.
^Robert L. Bunting, "A Debt Management Proposal," 
Southern Economic Journal, XXV (January, 1959) , p. 341.
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A review of the operations of the savings bond program 
from March 1, 1935 to December 31, 1963, by periods, follows. 
As will be shown, changes in responses of investors to 
Treasury offerings of savings bonds were probably large 
enough to have had an important liquidity impact on the 
economy. During calendar years 1951-63, the liquidity im­
pact was generally procyclical since recessions were rela­
tively short in duration during this period of time. It 
appears that the advocates of countercyclical debt manage­
ment would gain more support for their position if debt 
management were expanded to consider the liquidity impact 
of the savings bond program. When this approach is adopted, 
answers to the questions previously posed would come forth.
Investor Response in the Period of Origin,
March _1, 1935 to April 30. 1941
The responses of investors to Treasury offerings of 
savings bonds from March 1, 1935 to April 30, 1941 are indi­
cated largely by the data for gross sales and redemptions of 
series A-D bonds. As shown in Table 3-1, both gross sales 
and redemptions increased during the period. In general, 
however, the gradual growth indicated for gross sales did 
exceed the rising, but small, amounts of redemptions which 
did occur. Investments in series A-D bonds were probably 
induced by the attractiveness of the features of savings
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TABLE 3-1.--Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of Series 
A-D Bonds during the Period of Origin, March 1, 1935 to 
April 30, 1941
(Millions of dollars)
Fiscal
year
Gross
sales
(Issue
price)
Redemptions 
(Issue price 
plus accrued 
discount)
Net
sales
Proportion of 
redemptions to 
gross sales 
(Per cent)
Yearly Cumulative
1935*1* 63 1 62 1 1
1936 264 11 253 4 4
1937 515 36 479 7 6
1938 488 67 421 14 9
1939 688 82 606 12 10
1940 1,107 115 992 10 10
1941(2) 824 147 676 18 12
Total 3,948 459 3,489 12
Source: Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury
on the State of the Finances for Fiscal Year Ended 1941, p. 24.
Note: Net sales equal gross sales at issue price minus
redemptions at issue price plus accrued discount on bonds 
redeemed. Differences, cumulations, and percentages are 
based on unrounded figures.
(1) March 1, 1935 to June 30, 1935.
(2) July 1, 1940 to April 30, 1941.
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bonds. In addition to safety of principal, series A-D bonds 
provided investors declining opportunity costs of purchasing 
savings bonds during the period. Since the opportunity costs 
of holding A-D bonds also declined, increasing redemptions 
during the period indicate that some purchasers were un­
doubtedly short-term lenders. Cumulatively, however, redemp­
tions accounted for only 12 per cent of gross sales (Table 
3-1).
While pursuing the objectives of the savings bond pro­
gram, the Treasury provided itself with an expanding source 
of cash receipts. In fact, total net sales of series A-D 
bonds provided the Treasury with $3,489 million (Table 3-1). 
To the extent that early redemptions were penalized by low 
yields relative to marketable government securities, of 
course, the cost of short-term borrowing for the Treasury 
fell over the period as early redemptions increased during 
the period.
The general acceptance of savings bonds by investors 
also allowed the Treasury to place somewhat greater reliance 
on nonmarketable debt in financing its deficits. Even though 
the national debt increased by 65 per cent from June 30, 1935 
to April 30, 1941, the concurrent growth in holdings of 
savings bonds changed the composition of the national debt 
from 0.2 to 7.7 per cent savings bonds. (See Table 3-2).
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TABLE 3-2.--Outstanding Series A-D Bonds and the Federal 
Gross Debt by Fiscal Years, 1933-41
(Millions of dollars)
Fiscal
year
Outstanding
savings
bonds
Federal
gross
debt
Proportion of outstanding 
savings bonds to Federal 
gross debt 
(Per cent)
1935 62 28,701 0.2
1936 316 33,545 0.9
1937 800 36,427 2.2
1938 1,238 37,167 3.3
1939 1,868 40,445 4.6
1940 2,905 42,971 6.8
1941(1) 3,647 47,236 7.7
Source: Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.
1941. p. 555; ibid. 1943. p. 606.
Note: Federal gross debt outstanding excludes guaran­
teed securities issued by the Treasury.
(1) April 30, 1941 rather than June 30, 1941.
Investor Response in the Expansionary Period.
May 1. 1941 to December 31. 1946
The responses of investors to Treasury offerings of 
savings bonds from May 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946 are indi­
cated to a large extent by the data for gross sales and redemp­
tions of series E, F, and G bonds combined. As can be seen
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in Table 3-3, the ending of the Second World War coincides 
roughly with a common turning point in the early trends dis­
played by gross sales and redemptions. In the former, a 
rapid expansion is reversed; in the latter, a rising trend 
is accelerated.
The rapid rise in gross sales from May 1, 1941 to the 
end of the war was perhaps largely due to the substantial 
rise in income during the war. At the same time, there was 
a scarcity of consumer goods, so that the aggregate volume 
of savings was relatively large. In part, aggressive 
solicitations, appeals to patriotism, and success in expand­
ing the membership in payroll savings plans to 25 million 
by mid-1945^ were contributing factors also. In addition, 
as an alternative either to hoarding or acquiring other 
liquid financial assets, savings bonds were relatively at­
tractive. In this respect, however, some purchasers were 
undoubtedly short-term lenders since early redemptions in­
creased continuously from May 1, 1941 to the end of the war 
(Table 3-3).18
^Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury. 1946. 
p. 47.
18
If redemptions of series A-D bonds had been included 
also, total redemptions would be slightly larger than that 
indicated in Table 3-3. In 1945 and 1946, respectively, re­
demptions of series A-D bonds increased as series A and B 
bonds were redeemed at maturity.
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TABLE 3-3.--Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of 
Series E, F, and G Bonds, during the Expansionary 
Period, May 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946
(Millions of dollars)
Calendar
year
Gross
sales
(Issue
price)
Redemptions^  ^
(Issue price 
plus accrued 
discount)
Net
sales
Proportion of 
redemptions to 
gross sales 
(Per cent)
Yearly Cumulative
1941*2) 2,537 14 2,523 i 1
1942 9,157 246 8,911 3 2
1943 13,729 1,504 12,225 11 7
1944 16,044 3,263 12,781 20 12
1945 12,937 5,332 7,605 41 19
1946 7,427 6,038 1,389 81 27
Total 61,831 16,397 45,434 — 27
Source: U.S., Office of the Secretary, Treasury
Bulletin (March, 1948), p. 25.
Note: Net sales equal gross sales at issue price
minus redemptions at issue price plus accrued discount 
on bonds redeemed. Differences, cumulations, and per­
centages are based on unrounded figures.
(1) Beginning October 1944, redemptions include small 
amounts of unclassified series A-D redemptions.
(2) May 1, 1941 through December 31, 1941 only.
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A couple of factors can be cited to explain the rapid 
decline In gross sales and the acceleration In redemptions 
Immediately following the end of the war. First, the Treasury 
was no longer pressed to raise large amounts of funds. The 
Eight War Loan Drive, which was conducted during the last 
quarter of 1945, was in fact the last of the large scale 
appeals for funds. Thereafter, the promotion of the payroll 
savings plan became less vigorous and, in part, contributed
to the drastic decline in its participating membership to
19
7.5 million in mid-1946. Second, but of greater import­
ance apparently, the urgent demand for consumer goods-- 
which was built up during the war period while a vast accu­
mulation of liquid financial assets occurred-^contributed 
to a decline in personal savings out of current income.
The savings bond program was an extremely important 
source of cash receipts for the Treasury from May 1, 1941 
to December 31, 1946. Cumulatively, net sales provided
$45,434 million in spite of redemptions of 27 per cent of
20
gross sales (Table 3-3). To the extent that early redemp­
tions were penalized by low yields relative to marketable
^9Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1946, 
p. 47.
20When redemptions of series A-D bonds are included, 
total redemptions average 28 per cent of cumulative gross 
sales. Cumulative net sales, in this case, provided only 
$44,529 million.
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government securities, the cost of short-term borrowing for 
the Treasury fell over the period as early redemptions in­
creased during the period.
As indicated by the rise in savings bonds as a percent­
age of the national debt, the Treasury was able to place 
greater reliance on the sale of nonmarketable debt in financ­
ing its deficits during the war. (See Table 3-4). The sale 
of savings bonds during the Eight War Loan Drive, on the 
other hand, enlarged the cash balances of the Treasury 
greatly in excess of its immediate need for funds. By re­
tiring marketable debt, especially that held by commercial 
banks, the Treasury began to reduce its excess cash balances 
in February, 1946. Since holdings of savings bonds expanded 
simultaneously with the reduction of marketable debt, these 
bonds accounted for 19.2 per cent of the national debt by 
the end of the period.
As can be seen in Table 3-4, outstanding group I bonds 
at the end of the war accounted for approximately two-thirds 
of the combined holdings of groups I and 11 bonds. Concur­
rently with the reduction of marketable debt in 1946, out­
standing group II bonds increased significantly, but out­
standing group I bonds declined slightly. Perhaps, uncertainty 
in the financial markets created a greater net shift to sav­
ings bonds of group II than of group I, and the urgent demand
TABLE 3-4.--Outstanding Savings Bonds by Groups of Bonds and Federal Gross Debt, 
Calendar Years 1941-46
(Millions of dollars)
Calendar
year
Amount outstanding at end o>E year
Proportion of savings bonds 
to Federal gross debt
(Per cent)Savings bonds
Federal
gross
debtTotal Group I Group II Total Group I 1 Group II
j
1941 6,140 1,134 1,390 58,020 10.6 2.0 2.4
1942 15,050 6,923 4,524 108,170 13.9 6.4 4.2
1943 27,363 15,957 7,789 165,877 16.5 9.6 4.7
1944 40,361 25,515 11,208 230,630 17.5 11.1 4.9
1945 48,183 30,727 13,979 278,115 17.3 11.0 5.0
1946 49,776 30,263 16,365 259,149 19.2 11.7 6.3
Source: For savings bond data, Treasury Bulletin (March, 1948), p. 24; for gross
debt data, each yearly issue of the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury from 
1942-48.
Note: Group I bonds include only series E bonds; group II bonds, series F and G
bonds; all outstanding series are included in total savings bonds. Federal gross debt 
excludes guaranteed securities issued by the Treasury.
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for consumer goods created a greater net shift out of savings 
bonds of group I than of group II.
Investor Response in the Postwar Period.
Calendar Years 1947-63
Prior to the postwar period, the activity in savings 
bonds produced a net cash inflow for the Treasury while the 
outstanding amounts of these bonds expanded. Generally, many 
factors contributed to this growth in the program. The pri­
mary ones were: (1) a shift to savings media of unquestioned
safety in reaction to the financial crisis of the early 1930's;
(2) the attractiveness of savings bonds in comparison to al­
ternative investments in terms of yields and liquidity; and
(3) the massive promotion of savings bonds via war loan drives 
and the regularity of purchases through payroll savings plans 
when consumer goods were scarce.
During the postwar period, in sharp contrast, the pro­
gram resulted in a net cash outflow for the Treasury while 
outstanding savings bonds declined slightly. (See Table 3-5.) 
Generally, this decline reflects the disappearance or weaken­
ing of the factors that earlier contributed to the favorable 
acceptance of savings bonds. In attempting to attribute this 
decline to causal factors--of which the yield attractiveness 
of savings bonds vis-£-vis alternative investments appears to 
be the predominant single factor--the activity in savings
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bonds during the postwar period is divided into two phases.
The first phase, which extends through calendar years 1947-50, 
accommodates the delayed return to "free" financial markets 
In 1951. As might be expected, factors other than the yield 
attractiveness of savings bonds must be relied upon to ex­
plain the fluctuations in savings bond activities during 
calendar years 1947-50.
TABLE 3-5.--Summary of the Savings Bond Program by Periods, 
March 1, 1935 to December 31, 1963
(Millions of dollars)
Period
Outstanding 
savings bonds 
(End of the 
period)
Changes in 
outstanding 
savings bonds
Cumulative 
net sales
Origin, to 
Apr. 30, 1941 3,647 + 3,647 + 3,489
Expansionary, to 
Dec. 31, 1946 49,776 + 46,129 + 44,529
Postwar, to 
Dec. 31, 1963 48,827 949 - 20,917
From the low level in 1946, combined net sales of sav­
ings bonds Increased in 1947 and 1948, but declined precipi­
tously thereafter. (See Table 3-6 and Chart 3-1.) Declining
TABLE 3-6.--Combined Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of Savings Bonds for Periods 
of Years prior to 1947 and for each Year from 1947-63
(Millions of dollars)
Calendar
Combined gross sales
x (2)(Issue price)
Combined redemptions^  ^
(Issue price plus.„\ 
accrued discount)' ' Combined
Proportion of redemp 
tions to gross sales 
(Per cent)
year Yearly Cumulative Yearly j Cumulative 
___________ 1______________
net sales Yearly Cumulative
Periods of Years Prior to the Postwar Period
1935-40 ---- 3,449 379 — ---- 11
1941-46 ---- 65,779 ---- 17,807 ---- ---- 27
Postwar Period
1947 6,694 72,473 5,126 22,933 1,568 77 32
1948 7,295 79,768 5,144 28,077 2,151 71 35
1949 5,833 85,602 5,101 33,178 732 87 39
1950 6,074 91,675 5,840 38,018 234 96 41
1951 3,961 95,638 5,651 44,670 -1,690 143 47
1952 4,161 99,799 5,074 49,744 -913 122 50
1953 4,800 104,499 6,149 55,893 -1,349 128 53
1954 6,173 110,772 6,985 62,878 -812 113 57
TABLE 3-6 (cont.)
Calendar
Combined gross sales 
/T * N(2)(Issue price)
Combined redemptions^) 
(Issue price plus . 
accrued discount) Combined
Proportion of redemp­
tions to gross sales 
(Per cent)
year Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative net sales Yearly j Cumulative
i
Postwar Period
1955 6,276 117,048 7,301 70,179 -1,025 116 60
1956 5,517 122,565 8,264 78,444 -2,747 150 64
1957 4,605 127,170 9,630 88,074 -5,025 209 69
1958 4,689 131,859 7,255 95,329 -2,566 155 72
1959 4,320 136,179 8,772 104,101 -4,452 203 76
1960 4,350 140,529 6,732 110,833 -2,382 155 79
1961 4,539 145,068 5,595 116,428 -1,056 123 80
1962 4,278 149,346 5,602 122,030 -1,324 131 82
1963 4,760 154,106 5,021 127,051 -261 105 82
1947-63 -- -- — -- -20,917 -- —
1947-50 » _ _ _ _ _ • * * . — 4,685 -- —
1951-63 — — — » — — _ » — • " ™ -25,602
Source. Data for calendar years 1935-40, for 1941-46 and for 1947 from Treasury 
Bulletin (March, 1948), p= 24; data for 1948 to 1952, ibid.. (December, 1953), p. 19; 
data for 1953 to 1957, ibid , (December, 1958), p. 37; data for 1958 to 1963, ibid., 
-‘December, 1964), p. 64
TABLE 3-6 (cont, )
Note: Net sales, cumulative gross sales, cumulative redemptions and percentages are
calculated from the original data; net sales are gross sales at issue price minus redemp­
tions at issue price plus accrued discount.
(1) Includes both matured and unmatured bonds until March, 1961.
(2) Sales and redemption figures include exchanges of minor amounts of (1) matured 
series E bonds for series G and K bonds from May, 1951 through April, 1957 and (2) Series 
F and G bonds for series H bonds beginning January, 1960; however, they exclude exchanges 
of series E bonds for series H bonds.
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CHART 3-1.--Net Sales of Savings Bonds by Groups, 1946-63
3,000
»\ Group II bonds2,000
1,000 Group I bonds
0
-3,000
-4,000
Combined savings bonds-5,000
'58 61 1963
Calendar year
Source: For combined savings bonds, Table 3-6; for
groups I and II bonds, Tables B-l and B-2 in Appendix B.
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21
redemptions, rather than rising gross sales, plus a special
22offering of group II bonds in the latter year contributed
heavily to the rise in net sales in 19A7 and 19A8. By 19A9,
23
however, rising redemptions had drastically reversed this
early trend, although to some extent another special offering
2Aof group II bonds moderated the decline in net sales in 
1950.
21Rising net sales of group I bonds provided for the 
expansion of combined net sales of savings bonds early in 
the period. Unlike that for series A-D and group II bonds, 
net sales of group I bonds expanded in each year except 1950 
during calendar years 19A7-50. In particular, this recovery 
in net sales was concentrated in series E bonds in denomina­
tions of $10 to $100. See George Hanc, o£. cit., pp. 5A-55; 
and Table B-l in Appendix B, for the net sales of group I 
bonds.
^Financial institutions other than commercial banks were 
permitted to purchase F and G bonds in amounts exceeding pre­
vailing limits on annual purchases, and commercial banks were 
also permitted to purchase limited amounts of these bonds.
In 1958, the Treasury sold over $1 billion of F and G bonds 
to all investors in one month. See George Hanc, o£. cit., p. 
53.
^Redemptions of series A-D bonds increased significantly 
after 19A8, as the pool of matured bonds, which had not been 
granted an extended term to maturity option, increased. From 
$A82 million in 19A8, redemptions of series A-D bonds in­
creased to $810 million in 19A9 and to $1,003 million in 
1950. In addition, increased redemptions of group I bonds in 
1950 aggravated the decline in combined net sales of savings 
bonds in that year. Apparently, the decline in net sales of 
group I bonds helped to finance the large scare purchases of 
consumer goods which occurred at the outbreak of the Korean 
War. See George Hanc, 0£. cit., p. 53.
2A
In this special offering, the Treasury sold $930 mil­
lion of F and G bonds under similar terms to those sold in 
19A8. (See Footnote 22.)
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As the monetary authorities adjusted slightly the sup­
ported prices of short-term marketable government securities, 
yields on all short-term assets, especially those offered 
by private financial intermediaries, Increased. (See Chapter 
II, Chart 2-1, p. 26.) For short- more than long-term 
lenders, therefore, the yield attractiveness of savings 
bonds vis-^-vis alternative investments declined. Techni­
cally, of course, this means that the opportunity costs of 
purchasing a nonmarketable savings bond rather than a market­
able government security and of holding a savings bond rather 
than near moneys offered by financial intermediaries both in­
creased while the opportunity cost of redeeming a savings bond 
in order to purchase a marketable government security declined. 
(See Chart 2-2.) Furthermore, group II bonds, with a lower
yield schedule than that for group I bonds, were more vul-
25
nerable to small increases in competitive interest rates.
2 SUnlike the pattern for the net sales of group I bonds —  
rising after 1946 but declining sharply in 1950--group II 
bonds exhibited trends of declining gross sales other than in 
years of special offerings and rising redemptions. (See 
Tables B-l and B-2 in Appendix B for the annual net sales of 
group I and group II bonds, respectively.) Perhaps, too, for 
potential bondholders of group II more than for those of group 
I, greater uncertainty in the financial markets, as a result 
of the continued support of government security prices, pro­
vided for more "wait and see" decisions; these actions, of 
course, contributed to a reduction in the gross sales of sav­
ings bonds, especially after the 1948-49 recession.
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Passive open-market operations designed to continue 
the support of government security prices rendered monetary 
policy largely ineffective in controlling inflation prior to 
1948 and after mid-1950. In depreciating the value of all 
fixed claims, inflation therefore discouraged purchases of 
savings bonds and encouraged the redemption of outstanding 
bonds.^
Nevertheless, the savings bond program continued to be 
an important instrument of Federal debt management through­
out the first phase of the postwar period. Relatively small, 
but positive, combined net sales of savings bonds in each 
year cumulatively expanded the Treasury's net cash receipts 
by $4,685 million. (See Table 3-6.) These net sales plus 
accrued discount on outstanding bonds increased the face 
value of outstanding bonds to $58,019 million by the end 
of 1950. At this date, holdings of savings bonds represented 
22.6 per cent of the national debt--the postwar summit in the 
importance of savings bonds as a component of the national 
debt. (See Table 3-7.)
For group I bonds in particular, the urgent demand for 
consumer goods, which inflamed the inflationary pressures, 
likewise reduced the combined net sales of savings bonds. In 
addition, it should be noted, participating membership in pay­
roll savings plans declined from 7.5 million in mid-1946 to 
5.0 million in 1950.
TABLE 3-7.--Outstanding Savings Bonds by Groups of Bonds and Federal Gross Debt for 
Selected Calendar Years prior to 1947 and for each Year 1947-63
(Millions of dollars)
Calendar
Savings bonds outstanding Federal
gross
Proportion of savings bonds outstanding 
to outstanding Federal gross debt
(Per cent)
year Total Group I Group II debt Total Group I Group II
Selected Years prior to the Postwar Period
1941 6,140 1,134 1,390 58,020 10.6 2.0 2.4
1946 49,776 30,263 16,366 259,149 19.2 11.7 6.3
Postwar Period
1947 52,053 30,997 18,314 256,900 20.3 12.1 7.1
1948 55,051 32,188 20,613 252,800 21.8 12.7 8.2
1949 56,707 33,766 21,501 257,130 22.1 13.1 8.4
1950 58,019 34,493 23,089 256,708 22.6 13.4 9.0
1951 57,587 34,727 22,859 259,419 22.2 13.4 8.8
1952 57,940 35,324 22,616 267,391 21.7 13.2 8.5
1953 57,710 36,663 21,047 275,168 21.0 13.3 7.6
1954 57,672 38,233 19,439 278,750 20.7 13.7 7.0
TABLE 3-7 (cont.)
Calendar
Savings bonds outstanding Federal
gross
Proportion of savings bonds outstanding 
to outstanding Federal gross debt
(Per cent)
year Total Group I Group II debt Total Group I Group II
Postwar Period
1955 57,924 40,063 17,861 280,769 20.6 14.3
1956 56,293 41,398 14,895 276,628 20.3 15.0
1957 52,474 41,578 10,896 274,898 19.1 15.1
1958 51,192 42,589 8,603 282,922 18.1 15.1
1959 48,154 42,559 5,594 290,798 16.6 14.6
1960 47,159 43,137 4,022 290,217 16.2 14.9
1961 47,458 44,485 2,973 296,169 16.0 15.0
1962 47,535 45,499 2,036 303,470 15.7 15.0
1963 48,827 47,106 1,721 309,347 15.8 15.2
6.4
5.4
4.0
3.0 
1.9
1.4
1.0 
0.7 
0.6
Source: Savings bond data for 1941 to 1947 from Treasury Bulletin (March, 1948), pp.
24-26; data for 1948 to 1952, ibid., (December, 1953), pp. 19-20; data for 1953 to 1957, 
ibid., (December, 1958), pp. 37-38; data for 1958 to 1963, ibid. , (December, 1964), pp. 
64-65. Gross debt data obtained from each yearly issue of the Annual Report of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, 1942-1964.
TABLE 3-7 (cont. )
Note: Matured group II bonds outstanding are included in interest-bearing debt until
all bonds of the annual series have matured, and are then transferred to matured debt on 
which interest has ceased. Percentages are calculated.
(1) Interest-bearing debt.
(2) Gross debt outstanding excludes guaranteed securities issued by the Treasury.
oo
o
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A continuation of the precipitous decline in combined
27net sales of savings bonds into 1951 marked the beginning 
of successive annual cash drains for the Treasury during 
calendar years 1951-63. (See Table 3-6 and Chart 3-1.) 
Furthermore, the cash drains were extremely large in 1956-57 
and in 1959.
Immediately after the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord 
on March 4, 1951, short-term rates of interest, which had 
begun to rise slightly in the previous four years, continued 
to rise, but at a more rapid pace, and the rigid ceiling on 
long-term rates became permeable. This rapid deterioration 
in the yields of savings bonds relative to those on alterna­
tive investments is clearly indicated, for example, by the 
fact that the advantage in purchasing a new issue of group 
II savings bonds (for its maturity yield) rather than a 
long-term marketable government security had completely 
vanished by the end of 1951. The declining attractiveness 
of savings bond yields was undoubtedly linked to the continued 
decline in 1951 of combined net sales of savings bonds and the 
occurrence of the first annual cash drain for the program of
27The further decline in combined net sales in 1951, un­
like those in 1949 and 1950, was not due to a rise in redemp­
tions of maturing series A-D bonds. In fact, redemptions de­
creased from $1,003 million in 1950 to $436 million in 1951. 
For the remainder of the second phase, redemptions of these 
bonds were insignificant in that cumulative redemptions had 
reduced the amount of outstanding A-D bonds to $152 million 
by the end of 1951.
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28$1,630 million in Chat same year.
29
The modest upward revision in yield structures in 1932 
and the decline in marketable rates of interest during the 
1953-54 recession temporarily restored, in part, the yield 
attractiveness of savings bonds in comparison to alternative 
investments. Rapidly rising market rates of interest follow­
ing this recession, however, quickly eliminated these tempo­
rary boosts in, and reduced even further by 1957, the yield
30
attractiveness of savings bonds. In turn, annual net sales 
of groups I and II bonds declined drastically in 1956 and 
1957, and produced a combined net cash drain for the Treasury
28As might be expected from a rise in market rates of 
interest, declining gross sales and rising redemptions of 
groups I and II bonds took place in 1951. (See Tables B-l 
and B-2 in Appendix B.)
^ A s  noted in the previous chapter, the Treasury modi­
fied the savings bond program prior to changing its offer­
ings of savings bonds in 1952. This modification, of course, 
was an attempt to avoid a continuing cash drain from redemp­
tions of maturing series E bonds on and after May 1, 1951.
^Yields on marketable government securities set new 
postwar peaks in 1956 and 1957. As a result, the average 
annual yields on marketable government securities, with the 
exception of the shortest term issues, exceeded the revised 
(1952) maturity yield of 3.0 per cent on new issues of series 
E bonds in 1956. With the continued rise in the yields of 
marketable government securities, even the average annual 
yield on the shortest term issues exceeded the newly revised 
(1957) maturity yield of 3.25 per cent on new issues of series 
E bonds in 1957.
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of $7,772 million in those two years alone. Comparatively,
group II bonds, with their lower yield schedule than that of
group I bonds, were more sensitive to changes in market rates
of interest and their decline in net sales was greater than
31
that of group I bonds. (See Tables B-l and B-2 in Appendix
31Not only were the reductions in net sales during 1956 
and 1957 greater than that for group I bonds, but the decline 
in net sales of group II bonds actually began in 1955. Fol­
lowing the end of the rise in gross sales in 1954, gross 
sales decreased and redemptions increased; apparently, bond­
holders responded to some extent to the temporary increase in 
the yields of savings bonds in comparison to alternative in­
vestments during the 1953-54 recession. Of course, redemp­
tions of group II bonds, which carried no extended term to 
maturity option, expanded from 1955 through 1957 as bonds 
previously sold during calendar years 1943-45 were redeemed 
at maturity. Seemingly, funds obtained from these redemptions 
were not reinvested in savings bonds. Even if an extended 
term to maturity option had been granted to these holders, it 
is unlikely that redemptions of group II bonds would have 
been significantly different. j j o v the period from 1955 
through 1957, the net cash drain was $8,731 million^/ it 
may be recalled that series J and K bonds were withdrawn 
from the offerings of savings bonds during 1957.
In contrast to group II bonds, the declining net sales 
of group I bonds in 1956 and 1957 were preceded by expanding 
net sales, which began in 1953 in spite of rising redemp­
tions. Underlining these net sales of group I bonds from 
1953 through 1957 were: (1) the relative stability of par­
ticipating members in payroll savings plans (approximately 
8 million during the period from mid-1953 to mid-1957);
(2) an expanding pool of matured, but interest bearing 
bonds that were sold from 1943 through 1945; (3) the rela­
tively mild 1953-54 recession; (4) the expansion of the 
market for series E bonds and series E and H bonds, res­
pectively, in 1954 and 1955; and (5) the deterioration of 
the yields of savings bonds vis-lk-vis alternative invest­
ments after the recession of 1953-54.
Part of the rise in net sales of group I bonds during
1953-54 may reflect the response of investors to the tempo­
rary increases in the yields of these bonds in comparison
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B.) As a result of this experience, the Treasury discontinued
its offering of group II bonds. This action, of course,
marked the end of the Treasury's experimentation with savings
bonds designed especially for the needs of Investors of sub-
32
stantial means.
Similar to the previous sequence of events, the 1957 
revision in yield structures followed by the 1957-58 reces­
sion temporarily restored, in part, the yield attractiveness 
of group I bonds vis-l-vis alternative investments. The 
restrictive monetary policy pursued soon after this reces­
sion, however, rapidly tightened the financial markets, and, 
as market rates of interest set new postwar peaks in 1959,
to alternative investments. Part of the rise during
1954-55 may reflect the broadening of the market for series 
E in 1954 and series E and H bonds in 1955, i.e., trustees 
of employee savings plans became eligible series E bond 
purchasers in 1954 and personal trust estates became eli­
gible series E and H bond purchasers in 1955. In part due 
to decisions of bondholders not to accept the optional, 
extended term to maturity, net sales were hampered by rising 
redemptions from 1953 through 1955. The deteriorated rela­
tive yields of savings bonds by 1956 and 1957 evidently 
reversed the expanding net sales to the extent that a net 
cash drain of $962 million was experienced in 1957. As in 
the case for group II bonds, declining gross sales and ris­
ing redemptions characterized the declining net sales during 
1956 and 1957.
32
Later, in 1958, group I bonds were offered for sale 
to all investors other than commercial banks, and maturing 
series F and G bonds were made exchangeable for series E 
and H bonds without regard to the annual limit imposed on 
these bond purchases.
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the yield attractiveness of savings bonds in comparison to
alternative investments decreased appreciably. In spite of
the unprecedented change in yield structures on group 1
bonds that was made in 1959, combined net sales of savings
33
bonds declined drastically and produced a net cash drain 
for the Treasury of $4,452 million. A general shift to five
per cent marketable Treasury notes ("magic 5's") by indivi-
34 35duals and exchanges of group 11 bonds for marketable issues
36
undoubtedly aggravated the cash drain in 1959.
33In part, the decline resulted from increased redemp­
tions of matured bonds. See George Hanc, oj>. cit. , Table 
12, p. 59, and p. 64.
34"The offering of five per cent four-year ten-month 
notes in October 1959, was one of the few instances in 
recent years of substantial purchases by individuals 
of an offering of marketable Treasury securities. 
Allotments to individuals (including partnerships and 
personal trust accounts) of the 'magic fives' amounted 
to $778 million of the total of $2,316 million issued. 
Monthly data from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and 
National Association of Mutual Savings Banks indicate 
that savings inflow into savings and loan associations 
and mutual savings banks was substantially lower in 
October 1959 than in the corresponding period of the 
preceding year. Net sales of E and H bonds showed a 
similar drop." George Hanc, o£. cit., p. 64.
■^In December 1959, exchanges of F and G bonds issued in 
1948 for 4-3/4 per cent marketable notes of 1964 amounted to 
$760 million. See George Hanc, 0£. cit., Table A-4, p. 108.
■^Following the marked decline in combined net sales of 
savings bonds in 1959, the level of combined net sales has 
risen in every calendar year, except 1962. The net sales of 
group II bonds, which consist of redemptions only since 1957,
86
The negative combined net sales of savings bonds in each 
calendar year from 1951 to 1963, appears to reflect both the 
general reduction in the attractiveness of savings bonds 
yields relative to those on alternative investments and 
the discontinuance of the sale of group II bonds in 1957. 
During this period, the Treasury experienced a cumulative 
net cash drain of $25,602 million and outstanding savings 
bonds declined to $48,827 million by the end .of 1963. 
Reflecting both its inability to restore the attractiveness 
of savings bond yields due to the statutory interest rate 
ceiling and a desire to keep the interest cost on the na­
tional debt to a minimum, the Treasury turned increasingly 
to the sale of marketable securities in financing its budge­
tary deficits. Therefore, the importance of savings bonds
are approaching the zero level; this level of net sales 
should be achieved no later than 1969 since all group II 
bonds will have matured by February, 1969. On the other 
hand, the net sales of group I bonds increased during the 
1960-61 recession, as gross sales increased and redemp­
tions declined. (See Table B-l in Appendix B.) With the 
more moderate rise in market rates of interest--in comparison 
with the rapid rise of these rates after the 1957-58 reces­
sion- -the slight decline in net sales of group I bonds in 
calendar year 1962 was reversed by 1963.
In addition, the granting of the first extended term to 
maturity option to holders of H bonds with issue dates from 
June 1, 1952 - January 1, 1957 may have contributed to higher 
net sales of group I bonds since 1959. See Treasury Bulletin 
(September, 1961), pp. A-3 through A-4 for this announcement, 
and ibid. (October, 1961), pp. A-3 through A-5 for the sched­
ules of redemption values and yields of the extended term to 
maturity on these H bonds.
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as a component of the national debt declined. In fact, the 
$48,827 million of savings bonds outstanding by the end of 
1963 represented only 15.8 per cent of the national debt.
As of that date, however, outstanding group 1 bonds of 
$47,106 million were only slightly less than the amount of 
all savings bonds outstanding ($48,183 million) at the end 
of calendar year 1945.
CHAPTER IV
THE DEMAND FOR SAVINGS BONDS
The demand for any good is defined by a function re­
lating the quantity of the good demanded per unit of time 
(Dx) to its various determinants. By precedence, the ob­
jective determinants are the price of the good (Px), the 
prices of substitutes and/or complements (Py^, ' * *
Pv ), and income (Y); the subjective determinants are tastes 
y n
or preferences (U) and expectations (E). Symbolically,
d x - D ( Px ; pyi; Py2; . . • Pyn; y ; u ; e ). (4-1)
It seems feasible to analyze the demand for savings 
bonds within the framework of traditional demand theory.
In using this framework, the major objective is to estimate 
the demand for savings bonds, by groups, through the use of 
regression analysis.
In attempting to use the orthodox concept of demand in 
empirical research, the usefulness of the subjective deter­
minants is normally highly limited. With possibly the excep 
tion of bond denomination, this is also the case for savings 
bonds. To the extent that the denomination of the savings 
bond purchased depends upon the purchaser's taste or
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preference, a bond denomination variable appears to be a
desirable subjective determinant. Unfortunately, savings
bond data by denominations for the entire postwar period
were not available to the author at the time of this study.^
Nevertheless, a bond-denomination-range parameter
emerges from separate analysis of groups I and II bonds.
(See Table 2-1.) Since decisions to purchase and redeem
savings bonds of large denominations are likely to be made
on a more rational basis than are similar decisions for
small denominations, group analysis of savings bonds may
reasonably provide a practical substitute for a bond
2
denomination variable.
Alternative Dependent^ Variables 
In proposing a concept of the demand for savings bonds, 
several quantity variables might be considered as the de­
pendent variable. These possibilities and their relation­
ships to each other are summarized in equations (4-2) and (4-3).
^An attempt was made to obtain savings bond data by 
denominations for the years 1957-63 from the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury. Although the information was not obtained, 
the files from which the data could be obtained appear to be 
accessible for individual research.
With respect to bond denominations only, series H 
bonds, which were offered in demonations of $500 or more, 
would have been placed in group II rather than group I 
bonds.
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^Outstanding bonds - net sales + accrued
discount on outstand­
ing discount- 
appreciation securi­
ties; and (4-2)
3
Net sales - gross sales - redemptions. (4-3)
Some of these possibilities can be eliminated rather
easily. First, accrued discount on outstanding securities
is determined primarily by exogeneous factors, i.e., the
distribution of outstanding bonds by the length of time
they have been held and the schedules of yields applicable
4
to the outstanding savings bonds. Therefore, accrued dis­
count should be relatively stable except for the large 
shift which occurred in 1959 when the schedule of yields 
for all outstanding and new group 1 bonds was changed. 
Clearly, accrued discount on outstanding savings bonds 
should be eliminated as the dependent variable.
If gross sales and redemptions were independent of 
each other, a highly sophisticated demand function for 
savings bonds could be proposed. This would involve the
3
Redemptions are defined to include accrued interest 
on redeemed securities.
variety of schedules of yields for both groups of 
bonds existed prior to the 1959 change in yield structure 
for outstanding and new issues of group I bonds. Since 
then, however, a schedule of yields has applied to all 
bonds in group I.
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difference between a function for gross sales and a func­
tion for redemptions. Considering both gross sales and 
redemptions would be preferred to a single function for 
either net sales or the change in outstanding bonds. At 
any given time, of course, decisions to purchase and deci­
sions to redeem savings bonds are likely to be made by dif­
ferent individuals.^ Furthermore, the motives in purchasing 
and in redeeming savings bonds are likely to be different.
Objective determinants for net sales and the change 
in outstanding bonds can not be defined easily. Apparently, 
composite determinants are required.
£
When savings bonds mature, the maturity value of each 
bond may be reinvested in savings bonds during the same 
period. Except for this case, it seems highly unlikely 
that decisions to purchase and to redeem savings bonds would 
be made by the same individuals within a one year period of 
time.
Although unavailable after fiscal year 1957, earlier 
data on redemptions of savings bonds within one year after 
the date of purchase indicated that such redemptions were 
lower the larger the denomination. For the $25 series E 
bond, for example, 52 per cent of the bonds sold each year 
from 1947 to 1957 were redeemed within a year after the 
date of purchase; for the $500 series E bond, approximately 
12 per cent of the bonds sold in this period were redeemed 
within a year after their date of purchase. See Annua1 
Report of the Treasury, 1958, pp. 556-562.
Undoubtedly, this information is not sufficient to 
provide a basis for assuming "independence” between deci­
sions to purchase and redeem savings bonds unless the 
Treasury depended primarily upon the sales of the larger 
denominations in order to provide most of its funds raised 
from the sale of savings bonds. George Hanc indicated 
that was the case until 1958 for both groups of bonds, but 
especially for group II bonds. See George Hanc, The United 
States Savings Bond Program In The Postwar Period (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.,1962), pp. 44-46, 
and 55.
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In this sense, gross sales and redemptions may be somewhat 
independent of each other.
Independence in this sense, however, is somewhat ir­
relevant. Theoretically, a rational decision to purchase a 
savings bond can not be made without considering the terms 
under which the security can be redeemed. This would in­
volve not only the yield for the expected holding period, 
but also the yields if redemption were earlier or later 
than originally anticipated. In this sense, gross sales 
and redemptions are not independent.
The critical criterion of independence lies with the 
identification of the determinants. Later, when the price 
determinants of demand are defined, it will be clear that 
the price variables for gross sales and redemptions possess 
a considerable degree of interdependence. This obvious lack 
of independence between the functions for gross sales and 
redemptions appears to limit thej.r usefulness.^
We are now left with either the change in outstanding 
bonds or net sales as the dependent variable in our demand
7
On the other hand, these two variables are helpful 
in formulating price concepts that are useful when con­
sidering net sales as the dependent variable. To some 
extent, therefore, gross sales and redemptions may be 
used as alternative dependent variables in order to check 
the consistency of the results obtained with net sales.
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functions. There really seems to be little reason to 
choose one over the other, and the decision was made quite 
arbitrarily. Net sales was chosen since gross sales and 
redemptions are helpful in formulating the concepts of the 
price of savings bonds.
The characteristics of savings bonds as financial 
assets provide a basis for defining price determinants; 
therefore, the next section is devoted to this topic.
Liquidity and Term to Maturity of Savings Bonds
The holder of money possesses the most liquid asset
available. By holding an asset that is 100 per cent liquid,
the holders of money sacrifice the additional income that
is earned by lenders. In order to receive the return that
is earned by lenders, the holders of money must depart with
their most liquid asset. Unavoidably, in substituting some
other financial asset for money, some degrees of liquidity
are sacrificed. Moving along a spectrum from the most
liquid to the least liquid asset, the substitution of higher
8
returns for degrees of liquidity can be envisioned.
Except for minor limitations, any savings bond can be 
redeemed for the full amount of money originally invested,
fl
Beard, "Counter-Cyclical Debt Management--A Suggested 
Interpretation," pp. 246-248.
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plus some return. A published redemption schedule Indicates 
the exact return to be realized, depending upon the length 
of time the bond is held. As a nonmarketable security, a 
savings bond protects its owner from any loss in value due 
to a rise in the market rate of interest, i.e., it is devoid 
of money risk. As an obligation of the United States gov­
ernment, a savings bond has minimum risk of default, i.e., 
it is relatively free of credit risk. All savings bonds, 
whether of the discount-appreciation type--series E, F, and 
J--or the current-income type--series H, G, and K--meet the 
requirements of highly liquid assets.
Based on their terms to maturity, savings bonds could 
be classified as long-term securities and holders of sav­
ings bonds as long-term lenders. On the other hand, since 
savings bonds can be redeemed virtually at any time after 
the bonds have been purchased, savings bonds could be clas­
sified as very short-term securities or, in fact, any 
length-of-term securities along the spectrum from short- 
to long-term issues. In this case, the holders of savings 
bonds could be considered short-term lenders or any length- 
of-term lenders, depending upon the period of time savings 
bonds are held.
The great liquidity of savings bonds and the various 
possible classifications of bondholders permit a considerable
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range in defining the prices of savings bonds, their substi­
tutes and complements.
Alternative Independent Determinants 
The determinants of the demand for a good were itemized 
in equation (4-1). In adapting any financial asset to this 
framework, proxy independent variables must be substituted 
for the independent determinants. Since no single proxy 
variable appears to be adequate in providing a sufficient 
independent determinant, perhaps several proxy variables can 
be proposed for a single determinant.
Proxy Price Determinants 
Theoretically, the demand for a good per unit of time 
depends upon its price and the prices of its substitutes and 
complements. The inverse relationship between the price of 
a good and its quantity demanded per unit of time is sum­
marized by a demand schedule that is identified by parame­
ters assumed to be held constant. A change in the price 
of a substitute or complementary good shifts the demand 
schedule for the good in question. With an increase (de­
crease) in the price of the substitute good, the quantity 
of the good demanded increases (decreases) as the demand 
schedule for the good shifts upward to the right (downward 
to the left); with an increase (decrease) in the price of
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a complementary good, the quantity of the good demanded 
decreases (Increases) as the demand schedule for the good 
shifts downward to the left (upward to the right).
For financial assets, prices as opportunity costs appear 
appropriate. Therefore, the adaptation for savings bonds 
might be in terms of appropriate yield differentials. Un­
fortunately, this approach does not provide any prices of 
substitutes and complements. On the other hand, several 
prices of savings bonds can be defined.
Purchasers' Price of Savings Bonds (Cj^ j)
With the variety of alternative liquid assets that 
are available to potential purchasers of savings bonds, 
many concepts of opportunity cost are possible. One pos­
sible proxy for price is the opportunity cost of acquiring 
savings bonds rather than a marketable government security. 
While a variety of time-holding-periods could be considered 
in measuring this opportunity cost, each possible yield dif­
ferential would indicate the value that rational purchasers 
attach to the absence of money risk on a nonmarketable sav- 
ings bond. These yield differentials, of course, would not
q
Three continuous series of average yields on market­
able government securities are published in the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin; these are average yields on short-term 
(9-12 months) issues, intermediate-term (3-5 years) obli­
gations, and long-term (ten years or more) securities.
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measure the difference in credit risks assumed by the lenders 
since both types of assets are government liabilities. For 
the remainder of this study, this concept of the purchasers' 
price of savings bonds will be referred to as the "oppor­
tunity cost of purchasing a nonmarketable government security"
(CNM> *
In the previous section some doubt was raised as to 
whether the purchasers of savings bonds are primarily 
lenders in the money market (short-term) or lenders in the 
capital market (long-term). One of the objectives of the 
savings bond program since its beginning has been to dis­
courage the (ex-ante) short-term lenders by adopting low 
rates of return for early redemptions. Although the sched­
ules of yields for early redemptions were raised in 1952,
1957, and 1959, the Treasury's objective of discouraging 
(ex-ante) short-term lenders has not been discarded. The
yield realized if redemption occurs prior to maturity has
10
remained consistently lower than the maturity yield.
Since yield differentials between marketable government se­
curities and savings bonds are to be measured quantitatively, 
the various measurements of the price of savings bonds are 
limited to comparable time-holding-periods allowed by these 
three series of marketable government securities,
^Presumably, the schedules of yields have been changed 
to make savings bonds more attractive to (ex-ante) long-term 
lenders, who unexpectedly become (ex-post) short-term lenders.
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If savings bond purchasers are primarily long-term 
lenders, could be measured by the differential between
the average return on long-term marketable government se­
curities (with a term to maturity equal to that of the 
savings bond) and the maturity yield on the savings bonds.
On the other hand, the differential between the average 
return on short-term marketable government issues and the 
yield (for a comparable time-holding-period) on savings 
bonds could be used to measure Cj^ for short-term lenders. 
These two measures, however, are certainly not exhaustive.
It is possible, but perhaps unlikely, that the changes in 
the schedules of yields during the postwar period have at­
tracted (ex-ante) short-term lenders to savings bonds. 
Moreover, the widely publicized maturity yields on savings 
bonds may have attracted unsophisticated lenders. For these 
reasons, could be measured by the differential between
the average return on short-term marketable government 
issues and the maturity yield on savings bonds. Each of 
these possible measures of appears to be worthy of some 
consideration.
In summary, the following measures of for each
group of bonds during the postwar period are proposed:^
^For group I bonds, the yield on savings bonds is 
measured by the yields on new issues of series E bonds only;
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^NM “ t l^e °PPort:unity cost of purchasing a non- 
marketable government security for group I 
(series E and H) bonds.
C m  ■ the opportunity cost of purchasing a non- 
J marketable government security for group II 
(series F, G, J, and K) bonds.
^NM or ^NMo " t*ie ferential between the average 
"“11 *1 yield on long-term marketable govern­
ment securities and the maturity yield 
on savings bonds.
cNMio or CNM " the differential between the average 
1 *2 yield on short-term marketable govern­
ment securities and the maturity yield 
on savings bonds.
the differential between the average 
yield on short-term marketable govern­
ment securities and the yield on 
savings bonds held for a time-holding- 
period of one year.
Regardless of which yield differential is the best 
measure of Cj^, theoretically this opportunity cost should 
be inversely related to gross sales. As the average yield 
on marketable government obligations rises relative to the 
yield on savings bonds, the purchasers of savings bonds 
forego the higher return on the marketable issues, i.e.,
for group II bonds, new issues of series F and J bonds.
For marketable government securities, the average yield 
on long-term securities is measured by the average annual 
yields on marketable government securities with terms to 
maturity of ten years or more; the average annual yield on 
short-term marketable government securities is measured by 
the average annual yields on marketable issues with terms 
to maturity of 9-12 months.
c n m 13 or c n m 23
100
rises. A relative rise in the return on marketable 
issues, therefore, should be associated with a decline in 
the net sales of savings bonds.
Redeemers1 Price of Savings Bonds (Cr )
Once the minimal time period during which savings bonds 
can not be redeemed has elapsed, holders of savings bonds 
can choose to re-evaluate their asset portfolios in deciding 
whether to redeem or continue to hold these issues. In mak­
ing this decision, the alternative use of the funds to be 
obtained if a savings bond is redeemed is obviously a stra­
tegic factor. If the potential redeemers1 price of a sav­
ings bond is defined as the price of redeeming a savings 
bond in order to purchase a marketable government security, 
this opportunity cost provides another proxy variable for the 
price of savings bonds. This concept of the redeemers price 
of a savings bond will be referred to as the "opportunity 
cost of redeeming a savings bond before its maturity in order 
to purchase a marketable government security" ( C r ) . When the 
prospective yield to maturity on a savings bond rises rela­
tive to the average yield on comparable marketable govern­
ment issues, rises. A rise in C^, therefore, should in­
duce a decline in redemptions. Thus, a rise in should be 
associated with an increase in net sales.
101
If average life data for savings bonds were available, 
an approximation of could be obtained by anchoring the 
prospective yield to maturity to a time-holding-period equal 
to the average life of the bonds In each group. Unfortunately, 
this approach, while sound In principle, had to be discarded 
because of the absence of sufficiently detailed data. Some 
other method had to be employed in obtaining an estimate of 
the time-holding-period.
Because of the inappropriateness of both long-term and 
short-term yields, it appears that the average yields on 
intermediate-term (3-5 years) marketable government securi­
ties might be the most appropriate yield series for measuring
during the postwar period for both group I and group II 
12bonds. With this as a starting point, the time-holding- 
period range for each group of bonds is defined as the dif­
ference between the original term to maturity of savings 
bonds and the term to maturity (3-5 years) of intermediate- 
term marketable government securities. From these time-
12Clearly, both short-term and long-term marketable 
government security yields are less appropriate. In the 
former case, the assumption would be made that savings 
bonds with an original maturity of ten years, for example, 
are redeemed roughly one year prior to maturity; in the 
latter case, the original term to maturity of the savings 
bond is equal to or less than the average term to maturity 
of long-term (ten years or more) marketable government 
securities.
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holding-period ranges, a constant time-holding-period of 
five years for group I bonds and seven years for group II 
bonds appears appropriate.^
In summary, the following measure of for each group 
of bonds Is proposed:
- the opportunity cost of redeeming group I bonds
1 before maturity In order to purchase a market­
able government security, which is equal to the 
differential between the prospective yield on 
new issues of savings bonds held to maturity 
rather than redeemed at the end of a time- 
holding period of five years and the average 
yield on intermediate-term (3-5 years) market­
able government securities.14
CR - the opportunity cost of redeeming group II bonds
2 before maturity in order to purchase a market­
able government security, which is equal to the 
differential between the prospective yield on 
new issues of savings bonds held to maturity 
rather than redeemed at the end of a time-holding- 
period of seven years and the average yield on
13The original term to maturity of series E bonds was 
reduced from ten years in 1947 to seven years nine months by 
1963. Thus, the valid time-holding-period ranges for these 
bonds were seven to five years in 1947 and five to three 
years by 1963. To some extent, the seven-year time-holding- 
period for group II bonds is approximated in the same manner. 
With the discontinuance of the sales of group II bonds in 
1957, however, all of these bonds outstanding by 1964 would 
have been held longer than seven years. The minimum time- 
holding-period that could be assumed for the postwar period, 
therefore, appeared to be seven years.
14For group I bonds, the prospective yield to maturity 
on savings bonds is measured by prospective yields on new 
issues of series E bends only.
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Intermediate-term (3-5 years) marketable govern­
ment securities.15
An Alternative Price of Savings Bonds (Cgj))
As compared with marketable government securities, near 
moneys offered by financial intermediaries may represent 
even closer substitutes for savings bonds. Certainly, po­
tential purchasers and redeemers of savings bonds may con­
sider carefully such alternatives as time deposits and sav­
ings and loan shares, for example. Such assets possess many 
of the same characteristics as savings bonds. Because of 
the large number of highly liquid financial assets offered 
by financial intermediaries, it would be possible to define 
a whole family of opportunity cost concepts. Yet, potential 
holders of savings bonds do not consider all of the numerous 
outlets that bid for the savings of individuals if for no 
other reason than the fact that every community does not 
possess every type of savings outlet. Rather than selecting 
one near money to represent all of the numerous possibilities, 
a hypothetical composite savings deposit for individuals is 
calculated. This composite savings deposit includes shares 
in savings and loan associations and credit unions, savings
^For group II bonds, the prospective yield to maturity 
on savings bonds is measured by prospective yields on new 
issues of series F and J bonds only.
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and time deposits in commercial banks and mutual savings
banks, and postal savings deposits. It is felt that the
composite savings deposit provides a better single proxy
variable than would be provided by any one of the near
moneys alone. (See the note to Chart 2-2-B in Chapter 11.)
Therefore, another concept of the price of savings bonds
that will be utilized is the opportunity cost of holding
16
savings bonds rather than a composite savings deposit.
For convenience, this price concept will be referred to 
as the "opportunity cost of holding a composite savings 
deposit" (CgD).
Perhaps the best way of measuring CSD is to take the 
differential between the average yield on the composite 
savings deposit and the yield on savings bonds held for a 
time-holding-period equal to the reciprocal of the average 
annual turnover rate of the composite savings deposit.^
16As was the case with C ^  and Cr  previously, a lack of 
statistical independence between two price concepts for near 
moneys would undoubtedly arise if a differentiation were 
made between the purchasers' and the redeemers' points of 
view. Although either of the viewpoints could be used, the 
simpler of the two is chosen.
17
Theoretically, Cgp could be measured by the differen­
tial between the average yield on the composite savings de­
posit and the yield on savings bonds for a time-holding- 
period equal to the average life of the bonds. But, as pre­
viously mentioned, this information is not available for both 
groups of bonds.
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A rough approximation of the annual turnover rate of the 
composite savings deposit is provided by the following data 
collected by George Hanc. He found that the ranges of the 
annual turnover rates from 1948-60 for savings deposits were 
0.45 to 0.49 for commercial banks, 0.25 to 0.28 for mutual 
savings banks, and 0.25 to 0.30 for savings and loan asso­
ciations.^® Based on this data, it would seem reasonable 
to assume a three-year time-holding-period for the compos­
ite savings deposit. While such a time-holding-period can 
be used for group I bonds, a uniform, three-year time- 
holding-period for group II bonds does not appear to be 
strictly applicable due to the discontinuance of the sales 
of series J and K bonds in April, 1957. It appears, how­
ever, that a three-year time-holding-period can be used for 
the years from 1947-57; beginning in 1958 and for each year 
thereafter, a corresponding time-holding-period one-year 
longer than that of the preceding year might be used. As 
a result of this approximation, the time-holding-periods 
would range from four years in 1958 to nine years in 1963.
In summary, the following measure of CgD f°r each group 
of bonds is proposed:
*-®George Hanc, o£. cit. , p. 75.
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Cgo * the opportunity cost of holding a composite
1 savings deposit for group I bonds, which is 
equal to the differential between the average 
yield on a composite savings deposit and the 
yield on savings bonds held for a time-holding- 
period of three years.19
Cgo ■ the opportunity cost of holding a composite
2 savings deposit for group II bonds, which is 
equal to the differential between the average 
yield on a composite savings deposit and the 
yield on savings bonds held for a time-holding- 
period of three years for the years 1947-57
and for 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 years, respectively, 
for the years from 1958-63.20
The Proxy Income Determinant (Y)
An individual's demand for a normal good increases 
(decreases) as his income rises (falls). In terms of a 
demand schedule, an increase in income shifts the demand 
schedule for the good upward to the right, i.e., at each 
price of the good a larger quantity is demanded per unit 
of time after the rise in income. In the case of an 
inferior good, an increase in income decreases the quantity 
demanded at each price.
19For group I bonds, the yield on savings bonds is 
measured by the yields on new issues of series E bonds only. 
For the composite savings deposit, the average yield is 
measured by the effective yield paid to deposit holders.
(See Chart 2-1, notes.)
20For group II bonds, the yield on savings bonds is 
measured by the yields on new issues of F or J bonds. For 
both groups of bonds, the average yield on the composite 
savings deposit is identical.
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The distribution of income as well as its level may be 
a determinant of the market demand for a good. Thus, at 
least one additional variable representing the distribution 
of income may be required in explaining the effect of changes 
in income on demand. This may apply to savings bonds also.
The availability of national Income data and the lack 
of income data for actual purchasers of savings bonds sug­
gest that national income might be a suitable proxy variable 
for the level of income. Since one of the limitations placed 
on the purchasers of group I bonds until 1954 was that the 
purchaser must be a ’'natural person," disposable income 
appears to be the most appropriate income concept. If money, 
rather than real, income is used however, it appears that 
the purchasing power of the dollar should be considered as 
an additional independent variable. Even with real income, 
it is possible that a price index or a purchasing-power- 
of-the-dollar variable should be considered as an additional 
independent variable since savings bonds are fixed claims.
The depreciation (appreciation) of fixed claims in infla­
tionary (deflationary) periods has long been recognized. 
Although real income is utilized, an additional price in­
dex variable is excluded since it is anticipated that such 
a variable would not be significant according to quantita­
tive testing.
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On the other hand, a bond denomination variable would 
probably provide information about the distribution of in­
come among purchasers of savings bonds, even though small
21
denominations can be exchanged for larger denominations.
Although a bond denomination variable can not be included
within the demand function because the necessary data are
not available, separate analysis of groups I and II bonds
are to be undertaken; to some extent, this compensates for
the lack of a bond denomination variable, at least for
22group II bonds.
With respect to savings bonds, it appears that a real 
saving, rather than a real income, variable might be a 
better estimator of the income determinant. In this study, 
therefore, real income and saving are treated as mutually 
exclusive economic variables, i.e., either one, but not 
both, can be referred to as a measure of the income
21To some extent the denomination of the savings bond 
purchased may reflect the taste or preference of the pur­
chaser. More often, however, the level of income of the 
purchaser probably determines the selection of a denomina­
tion. With an anticipated direct relationship between the 
level of income and the denomination, a bond denomination 
variable in addition to an income variable should provide 
a sufficient proxy income determinant in that the effects 
of income and its distribution would be approximated.
22 Clearly, large denominations of savings bonds per­
vaded group II bond purchases whereas small denominations 
have been most important for group I bond purchases. (See, 
p. 89.)
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determinant. In addition, real saving and income variables 
could be considered in total (real) dollar amounts or de­
flated by population changes to yield per-capita figures.
In summary, any of the following proxy variables could 
be considered as a measure of the level of the income deter­
minant:
DI - Real disposable income.
DI/p - Per capita real disposable income.
PS - Real personal savings.
23
PS/p • Per capita real personal savings.
An Additional Proxy Income Variable (AY)
It is not anticipated that any of the proposed measures 
of the income variable will be an adequate income determi­
nant. To some extent, the empirical results for the income 
determinant could be improved if the single income variables
To avoid any spurious correlation due to the secular 
trend within each of these aggregate measures, it appears 
that the secular trend should be removed in each case before 
correlation analysis is attempted. In order to do this, the 
data for each year are expressed as a proportion of their 
corresponding secular trend value. In removing secular trend 
from an independent variable, however, the effect that the 
absolute level of the independent variable could have on the 
dependent variable is eliminated. That is, only the effect 
that the fluctuations of the independent variable might have 
on the dependent variable can be measured.
In each year DI is measured as a proportion of its 
linear secular trend value; DI/p, PS, and PS/p, as a pro­
portion of their corresponding parabolic trend value.
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were combined with an additional income variable. In par­
ticular, certain combinations of the proposed income meas­
ures with consumer durable expenditures, gross financial 
savings by individuals and/or net additions to savings 
accounts by individuals may be worthy substitutes for the 
single income measures.^
When the proxy income variable is either PS or PS/p, 
for example, similar variants of consumer durable expendi­
tures may be the appropriate additional income variable.
If savings bonds are purchased as a means of saving for 
planned future purchases of durable goods, a rise in con­
sumer durable expenditures should be associated with a 
decline in net sales, as savings bonds are redeemed in 
order to finance the purchase. If purchases of durable 
goods cause a postponement in purchasing savings bonds, a 
rise in consumer durable expenditures should be associated 
with a decline in net sales also. In the latter case, 
however, the decline in gross sales of savings bonds 
contributes to the decline in net sales. In summary, the 
proposed measures of the additional income variable are:
0 /
George Hanc (op. cit., pp. 48-65) relied upon these 
variables in analyzing the quarterly fluctuations in the 
net sales of savings bonds during the Korean War.
Ill
CDE ■ Real consumer durable expenditures.
25
CDE/p - Per capita real consumer durable expenditures.
On the other hand, when the proxy income variable is 
either DI or DI/p, either gross financial savings or net 
additions to savings accounts by individuals will be used 
as the additional income variables. In referring to these 
variables, the following symbols will be used.
GFS - Gross financial savings by individuals.
26NAS - Net additions to savings accounts by individuals.
Summary
With net sales as the dependent variable, the two 
groups of bonds during the postwar period are to be analyzed
Similar to the treatment of DI, DI/p, PS and PS/p, 
the secular trend in each of these variables is removed by 
measuring the variable in each year as a proportion of its 
secular trend value. Both CDE and CDE/p appeared to exhibit 
linear secular trends during the postwar period.
^Unless the tests of DI/p, PS/p, and CDE/p indicate 
that the per capita adjustment of a variable is preferred, 
this variation for GFS and NAS will be ignored. This ap­
proach has been selected in order to limit the possible 
measures of the additional income variable to a reasonable 
number.
A parabolic function appears to be appropriate in meas­
uring the secular trend for both GFS and NAS. The tremendous 
growth of each series during the postwar period, however, 
distorts the measurements of the proportion of secular trend 
value. As a substitute, therefore, the secular trends for 
GFS and NAS are removed, in part, by calculating the absolute 
deviations of the original data from their computed secular 
trend values.
112
within a framework similar to that for the demand for any 
good. Symbolically, the proposed net sales function is:
Dx - D (C^,; CR ; CSD; Y; AY). (4-4)
Several measures of Y, and AY have been proposed,
however. In the next chapter, estimates of the demand for 
both group I and group II bonds are attempted.
CHAPTER V
SINGLE AND MULTIPLE DETERMINANT ESTIMATES OF THE DEMAND 
FOR SAVINGS BONDS BY GROUPS, CALENDAR YEARS 1947-63
Estimates of the demand for group I and group II bonds 
are derived for the postwar period, calendar years 1947-63.
In utilizing the least squares method of deriving time 
series regressions, a "normal" time period had to be se­
lected. Since the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord did not 
occur until March 4, 1951, perhaps a case could be made for 
limiting the estimates of the demand functions to the sec­
ond phase of the postwar period--after the return to "free" 
financial markets. If the time period were limited only to 
the second phase, however, the derived demand functions would 
be based on a very short time period since only annual data 
are available for many of the proposed non-price variables. 
For this reason, the longer period was selected.
Two types of demand functions can be derived--single 
determinant estimates and multiple determinant estimates. 
Although the latter are preferred, the former could provide 
some information in selecting possible multiple determinants 
and in interpreting their results. Both types of estimates, 
therefore, are undertaken.
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In order to determine whether a proxy Independent 
variable is significant, the F-test is conducted at the 
95 per cent level of confidence.
Single Determinant Estimates of the Demand 
for Savings Bonds by Groups
For each group of bonds, a regression for annual net 
sales with each proxy independent variable was undertaken. 
The calculated coefficients of correlation for these re­
gressions are summarized in Table 5-1. As can be seen, 
the highest coefficients are generally associated with the 
various measures of Cj^ and with C^. The significant re­
gression equations and corresponding standard errors of 
the estimate are shown in Table 5-2.
TABLE 5-1.--Simple Coefficient of Correlation (R) between 
Annual Net Sales and each Independent Variable for 
Group I and Group II Bonds, 1947-63
Independent
variable
Group I bonds
(R)
Group II bonds
(R)
cNM13 -0.645
cnm12
-0.635
-0.521
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Table 5-1 (cont.)
Independent
variable
Group I bends
(R)
Group II bonds
(R)
CNM23 (1)
^NM22
-0.778
c n m 21 -0.727
Cr i
+0.462
c r 2 +0.752
CSD1 +0.024
c s d 2 -0,280
PS -0.230 -0.026
PS/p -0.214 +0.001
CDE -0.146 +0.047
CDE/p +0.105 -0.100
DI -0.067 +0.308
DI/p -0.226 -0.267
GFS +0.005 -0.020
NAS +0.219 -0.005
(1) Not applicable for the time period, calendar 
years 1947-63.
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TABLE 5-2.••Significant Simple Regression Equations and Stand 
ard Errors of Estimate (sg) for Group I and Group II 
Bonds from 1947-63
Regression equations S E
(Millions of dollars)
Annual net sales of group I bonds
+315 - 628.0 cn m 13 • 463
-554 - 474.9
c n m 12
• 468
-178 - 826.3 CNM1^ • 517
Annual net sales of group II bonds^^-
-1,489 - 1,283.7 . 1,334
-230 - 1,646. 9 cn m 21 • 1,528
+1,726 + 1,328. 2 c r 2 • 1,215
(1) Annual net sales are in millions of dollars; 
cNM1j * CNM2j » and CR2 * in per Cent: t^W° declmals)*
The "Opportunity Cost of Purchasing a 
Nonmarketable Government Security" (C^)
The anticipated inverse relationship between net sales 
and Cjjh was confirmed in all cases. Every and
tested was significant in accounting for the fluctuations 
in the annual net sales of groups I and II bonds. (See 
Table 5-2.) Thus, the price concept of the "opportunity
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cost of purchasing a nonmarketable government security"
(Cn m ) appears to be a determinant of annual net sales.
Both the largest coefficient of correlation and the 
smallest standard error of the estimate may be used in 
selecting the best estimator of annual net sales. For 
group I bonds, this is ^NM^* It Is to be recalled that 
*s measured by the differential between th& average 
return on short-term (9-12 months) marketable government 
securities and the yield on new issues of series E bonds 
held for a time-holding-period of one year. Furthermore, 
as this yield differential exceeds +0.50 percentage points, 
negative annual net sales can be expected (19 times out of
20). For group II bonds, on the other hand, the best esti­
mator of annual net sales is *n t*1*8 case, the ma­
turity yield on group II bonds would have had to exceed the
average yield on short-term marketable government securities 
by more than 1.16 percentage points in order to avoid nega­
tive annual net sales. This greater interest-rate sensitiv­
ity among group II bondholders than among group I holders
A regression for annual net sales with 01^23 was not 
considered appropriate and thus was not undertaken. With 
the discontinuance of gross sales early in 1957, this 
regression to a large extent would have measured the inter­
relationship between redemptions and a purchaser's price of 
savings bonds.
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tends to point out the Treasury's rationale for dropping the
2
sale of J and K bonds early in 1957.
The "Opportunity Cost of Redeeming a Savings Bond 
before its Maturity in order to Purchase a 
Marketable Government Security" (CR)
The anticipated positive relationship between annual 
net sales and CR was confirmed in both cases (Table 5-1). 
For group 1 bonds, however, the relationship was not sig­
nificant. It is to be recalled that CR  ^measures the dif­
ferential between the prospective yield on new issues of 
E bonds held to maturity rather than redeemed at a time- 
holding-period of five years and the average yield on 
intermediate-term (3-5 years) marketable government securi­
ties. To the extent that the net sales of group I bonds 
included redemptions of matured E bonds during their ex­
tended terms, the prospective yield to maturity on new 
issues was perhaps an inappropriate measure.
The relationship between annual net sales of group II 
bonds and however, was significant. The regression
2
The price concept of Cjjm is based on the purchaser's 
point of view. As such, should be a determinant of
gross sales as well as net sales. This proposition--which 
brings forth somewhat contradictory, but interesting, re- 
sults--is tested and discussed briefly in Appendix C. As 
mentioned earlier, however, these tests are subject to 
severe limitations due to a lack of independence which 
arises between the various prices of savings bonds.
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equation is shown in Table 5-2. Empirically, the prospective 
yield on new issues of F and J bonds held to maturity rather 
than redeemed at a time-holding-period of seven years would 
have had to exceed the average yield on intermediate-term 
marketable government securities by 1.30 percentage points
3
in order to avoid negative annual net sales.
Again, these results Indicate a somewhat greater 
interest-rate sensitivity among group II bondholders than 
among holders of group I bonds. With no option for an ex­
tended term available for group II bonds, perhaps Cr  is a 
more appropriate concept in this case than it is for group 
I bonds.
An anticipated lack of independence between the prices 
of savings bonds was called to the attention of the reader 
when gross sales and redemptions were eliminated as the 
dependent variables of the demand functions. Surely the 
high degree of correlation between each measure of and 
CR for each group of bonds indicates that independent func­
tions for gross sales and redemptions could not have been
o
The consistency of the results for net sales with 
was considered in Appendix C by analyzing the relationships 
between and gross sales. As mentioned earlier, however, 
these tests are subject to severe limitations. But, in a 
similar fashion, it is interesting to analyze the relation­
ships between Cr and redemptions. For this side study, see 
Appendix C.
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obtained. (See Table 5-3.) For the same reason, an 
independent multiple determinant net sales function can not 
be obtained unless either or alone is chosen as a 
proxy independent variable. Yet, with respect to net 
sales as the dependent variable, neither C^| nor alone 
appears to be a sufficient proxy variable. Logically, it 
appears that Cj^ and CR should be combined into a single 
(composite) proxy variable. However, the problem of 
assessing relative weights to and for the period 
from 1947 to 1963 for group I bonds and from 1947 to 1957 
for group II could not be resolved. As an alternative, 
therefore, both price concepts of and CR--in spite of 
their lack of independence--will be considered, later in 
the chapter, as possible prices of savings bonds in the 
multiple determinant analysis of net sales.
^Since the differentiation between viewpoints for pur­
chasers and redeemers can not provide independent prices of 
savings bonds, regressions for gross sales and redemptions 
have limited validity in testing the consistency of the 
results for net sales and were therefore omitted in the 
text.
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TABLE 5-3.--The Simple Coefficient of Correlation between 
each Cjq^  and C^ for each Group of Bonds, 1947-63
Group I bonds 
cNMij with cRi
Group
CNM2j
II bonds 
with Cr 2
cNM13 -0.526 CNM23 (1)
c n h 12 “°-899 c n m 22 -0.958
CNM u  -0.983 cNM21 -0.954
(1) Not applicable from 1947-63.
The "Opportunity Cost of Holding a 
Composite Savings Deposit" (Cgj))
The anticipated inverse relationship between annual net 
sales and Cgjj was confirmed for group II bonds, but not for 
group I bonds.^ (See Table 5-1.) In neither case was CSD 
significant. Perhaps these results are not surprising,
The unexpected relationship for group I bonds can not 
be explained. However, a simple regression for annual gross 
sales with CgQ. was undertaken. The anticipated negative 
relationship was obtained, but the relationship was not 
significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence. The 
relationship between redemptions and Cgj). was not investi­
gated even though the analysis of net sales and gross sales 
(redemptions) with C ^  (Cr ) indicated that little reliance 
could be placed on the differentiation between the purchasers' 
and redeemers' prices of savings bonds.
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since the calculated yields on the composite savings deposit 
during the postwar period exhibited very little cyclical 
fluctuations around their rising trend. (See Chart 2-1.)
Regardless of these results, Cgp may still be considered 
a price determinant in a multiple determinant analysis of 
net sales. Even with some probable lack of independence 
between C ^ ,  CR , and CgD , these three prices, taken as a 
group, may be good empirical proxies for the price of 
savings bonds. In deriving the multiple determinant esti­
mates of the demand for savings bonds, therefore, all three 
of these prices of savings bonds will be considered pos­
sible independent variables.
The Proxy Income Determinant
The results of the regressions indicated an inverse 
relationship between annual net sales of group I bonds 
and each of the four measures of the proxy income deter- 
minant--PS, PS/p, DI, and DI/p. (See Table 5-1.) Since 
none of these measures were significant by the F test in 
accounting for the fluctuations in annual net sales, only 
the consistency of the indicated inverse relationship might 
be noted. For group II bonds, the relationships between 
net sales and these four measures of the income determinant 
were negative only with PS and DI. Similar to the results 
for group I bonds, PS, PS/p, DI, and DI/p were not
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significant as single determinants of net sales.
In addition to the yield attractiveness of savings 
bonds relative to alternative investments, income or saving 
was undoubtedly an important determinant of the demand for 
savings bonds during the Second World War; since then, how­
ever, interest rate differentials appear to be more import­
ant than income or saving in explaining the demand for 
savings bonds, especially for group II. That is, no proxy 
income variable was found to be a single determinant of net 
sales, but for group I and both an<* CR 2 ^or
group II were significant single determinants of net sales. 
Furthermore, income or saving in comparison to interest 
rate differentials has perhaps become less important in 
explaining the demand for group I bonds since fluctuations 
in redemptions of E bonds (by denomination within a year 
from their date of purchase) indicate the same observation 
for E bonds. (See Chart 5-1.) For example, early redemp­
tions of E bonds within a year from the issue date exceeded 
45 per cent of the $25 bonds sold and 35 per cent of the 
$50 bonds sold. If the basic operation of the payroll sav­
ings plan is reflected by these activities in small denomi­
nations of E bonds, it might also be added, the effect that 
systematic purchases of E bonds through the plan had on the 
level of total saving was reduced considerably.
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CHART 5-1.--Percentage of E Bonds Redeemed Within One 
Year After Issue Date, by Selected Denominations, 1941-58
Per cent
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Calendar years, 1941-58
Note: Data are proportions of the value of bonds
originally sold in indicated calendar years which were 
redeemed (including redemptions of bonds reissued as a 
result of partial redemptions) before July 1 of the next 
calendar year. Sales and redemptions are taken at maturity 
values. Data are from Annual Report of the Treasury. 1959. 
pp. 542-546.
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An Additional Proxy Income Variable
The additional income variable also appears to be in- 
adequate as a single determinant of net sales for both 
groups of bonds. (See Table 5-1.) For group I bonds, 
positive relationships between net sales and CDE/p, GFS, 
and NAS were obtained; with CDE, an Inverse relationship 
was obtained. For group II bonds, the positive and nega­
tive relationships in each case were opposite to those ob­
tained for group I bonds.
Unfortunately, the method by which both the income and 
the additional income variables were measured obscures the 
economic significance of the results. Nevertheless, in a 
multiple determinant analysis of the demand for savings 
bonds by groups, all of the measures of the income and the 
additional income variables will be considered as possible 
independent variables.
Multiple Determinant Estimates of the 
Demand for Savings Bonds by Groups
The proposed demand function for savings bonds was 
summarized in equation (4-4). With five proxy independent 
variables in each demand function, a total of twenty-four 
regressions were required in order to estimate the demand 
functions for group I bonds; for group II bonds, only sixteen
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regressions were required.**
Estimates of the Demand for Group I Bonds 
The results of the simple regressions for annual net 
sales indicated that only the relationships derived from the 
"opportunity cost of purchasing a nonmarketable government 
security" (C^) were significant for group I bonds. Each 
of the three measures was an apparent determinant of annual 
net sales during the postwar period. The multiple deter­
minant regressions undertaken indicated that none of the 
other proxy independent variables could significantly aid 
any in accounting for the fluctuations in net sales.
That is, none of the measures of Cr ,^ Cgj)^ , the proxy in­
come determinant, or the additional income variable were 
significant as a second independent variable in the multiple 
determinant analysis. Moreover, no , as the second
independent variable, could significantly aid any of these 
other variables in their role as the first independent 
variable.
Therefore, appears to be the only apparent deter­
minant of the net sales of group I bonds. While any of the
Of course, all of the permutations of the required 40 
combinations of five independent variables in each regres­
sion for both groups of bonds were considered also.
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three measures of could be used, the best estimate of 
net sales appears to be with Cj^j^^--the differential between 
the average return on short-term (9-12 months) marketable 
government securities and the yield on new issues of E 
bonds held for a time-holding-period of one year. The use 
of this measure yields a coefficient of correlation of 
-0.645 and a standard error of the estimate of $463 (mil­
lions); the regression equation can be written as:
7
Annual net sales, 1947-63 - 315 - 628.0 (5-4)
As indicated previously, the yield on short-term marketable 
government issues would have had to exceed the one year 
yield on new issues of E bonds by more than +0.50 percentage 
points in order to obtain negative annual net sales of group 
I bonds (19 times out of 20).
Estimates of the Demand for Group II Bonds 
The simple regressions for annual net sales with Cj^ 
and CR indicated that all measures of these variables were 
apparent single determinants of annual net sales of group II 
bonds during the postwar period. The multiple determinant 
regressions undertaken indicated that a few of the other
7
Annual net sales are in millions of dollars; Cj^ , in 
per cent (two decimals).
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proxy independent variables could significantly aid either 
C&2 or 0^2 and accounting for the fluctuations in
net sales. With and as and second
independent variables, C ^ ,  Cj^^, DI, and Cgj^ were signifi­
cantly correlated with net sales. The other measures of the 
income variable (DI/p, PS, and PS/p) and those of the addi- 
tional income variable (GFS, NAS, CDG, and CDE/p) were not 
significant. This estimate of net sales for group II bonds, 
which has a standard error of the estimate of $513 (mil­
lions) , is summarized in equation (5-5).
Annual net sales, 1947-63 • -44,601 +
4,832.9 CR2 + 6,908.2 C ^  +
39,469.5 DI - 2,302.1 C g ^  .8 (5-5)
Only the positive relationship between net sales and
C^w is inconsistent with the (anticipated) results pre- 
21
viously obtained from the simple regression analysis. (See 
Tables 5-1 and 5-4.) A lack of independence between the 
three proxy variables for the price of savings bonds may 
have contributed greatly to this inconsistency.
Q
Annual net sales are measured in millions of dollars; 
cR2» cNM21» an(* CSD2 > Per cetlt (two decimals); and DI is 
measured as a fraction (four decimals).
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TABLE 5-4.--Total Coefficients of Determination (R ) , 
Total Coefficients of Correlation (R), and Partial 
Coefficients of Correlation (r) for Equations (5-5) 
and (5-6)
Independent variable 
added R2 R r
Equation (5-5):
Cr2
+0.565 +0.752 +0.752
c n m 21 +0.847 +0.920 +0.805
DI +0.908 +0.953 +0.680
c s d 2
+0.938 -0.968 -0.572
Equation (5-6):
Cp
2
+0.565 +0.752 +0.752
CSD2 +0.686 +0.828 +0.526
As indicated in Table 5-4, Cj^ alone accounts for 56.5 
per cent of the total variations in annual net sales during 
the postwar period. The addition of as second
independent variable significantly aids CR  ^ by accounting 
for 64.9 per cent of the fluctuations in net sales that were 
not accounted for (43.5 per cent) by Cr^ alone. The addi­
tion of real income (DI) as the third independent variable 
significantly aids CR  ^ and Cjn^i ^y accounting for 46.3 
per cent of the variations in net sales not accounted for
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(15.3 per cent) by both CR  ^ ^NM2 '^ ^SD2 * as t*ie f°urt*1
independent variable, significantly aids Cj^, an<* D*
by accounting for 32.7 per cent of the variations unac­
counted for (9.2 per cent) in annual net sales by the combi­
nation of CRz, and DI.
When the average values of Cj^, Dl* and CSD2
during the postwar period--0.646, 0.419, 1.00016, and 
0.716, respectively--are substituted in equation (5-5), 
annual net sales of group II bonds are calculated to be 
-$949 (million), as shown in Table 5-5. Perhaps equation 
(5-5) may also be used to indicate the greater importance 
of interest rate differentials as compared to income in the 
demand for group II bonds.
For example, the increases and the decreases in C ^ *  
cNM2i* DI» and CSD2 ^or eac*1 consecutive year during the 
postwar period were calculated as well as the averages of 
both the increases and the decreases for each of these 
variables. The average value of the six increases (ten 
decreases) for CR  ^ is 0.402 (-0.485); for ten i*1*
creases (six decreases) average 0.229 (-0.128); for DI, 
nine increases (seven decreases) average 0.01470 (-0.01286); 
and for CgD2» eleven increases (five decreases) average 
0.133 (-0.130). Furthermore, in only two of the sixteen 
years did all four variables change in the same direction.
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TABLE 5-5.--Calculations of Annuo1 Not Solos ond « Chango In 
Annual Not Sales of Group 11 Bonds for Soloctod Valuos of 
cR2» cNM2i’ DI* And CS02» o£ Average Pries Elasticities
for C« , Cum-., and CsDoi *nd of Avorago IncosM Elasticity 
for DI “  *
Item, for 
aquation (5-5)
Annual
not
salos
(Millions
Chango in 
annual 
not salos
of dollars)
Coofflciont of 
elasticities 
(Price or 
lncoteo)
Intercept -44,601 — —
Substituted CR, 
value:
40.646 (average) 2,929
-4.287 
2.92$ - 1.07
-0.887 /-0.485 - 
0.402/ — -4,287
-0.887
0.643
Substituted 
Cji^ ^i value:
40.419 (average) 
40.357 /0.229 -
(-0.12817
2,895
2,467
2.467
1 -o c
0.419
Substituted DI 
value:
41.00016 (average)
40.32960 10.01470 
- (-0.0128617
39,476
1,301
1,301 
39.476 -0.10 
0.3^960 
1,00016
Substituted CSD 
value: 2
40.716 (average)
40.263 /"0.133 - 
(-0.13017
-1,648
-605
-605 
-17348 - 1.00 
0.263
TOTAL -949 -1,124
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For the other fourteen observations, and were
inversely related in each case, but DI and changed in
the same direction six times and in opposite directions five 
times. For the entire postwar period, therefore, a change 
in *-n t*le opposite direction to that for DI, and
CgD2 was most common. Now that these preliminary calcula- 
tions have been made, they can be substituted into equation 
(5-5) in order to show the greater importance of interest 
rate differentials versus income in the demand for group II 
bonds. As shown in Table 5-5, a change in annual net sales 
is calculated by substituting into equation (5-5) the dif­
ferences between the average of the decreases (increases) 
and the average of the increases (decreases) for 
(CnM2 i* D*’ aru* ^SD2 *^ total absolute change in annual
net sales of group II bonds is influenced less by the change 
in income than by any of the changes in the interest rate 
differentials, except for the change in All of the
price elasticities, however, are numerically larger than 
the income elasticity. (See Table 5-5.)
When was substituted for *-n multiple
2 2
determinant analysis, it was significant in accounting for 
the variations in net sales only as a single independent 
variable. That is, was significant only as a single
determinant of net sales. None of the other variables--
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Cr 2, CSD^( the various income measures and the various 
additional income measures--could significantly aid 
as the first independent variable, in accounting for the 
fluctuations in net sales.
Without a as t*ie 8econ<  ^Independent variable,
however, only Cr 2 and Cgu2 were significant multiple deter­
minants of net sales. This relationship is shown in equa­
tion (5-6) and has a standard error of the estimate of $1,070 
(millions).
Annual net sales, 1947-63 « -4,105 +
1,930.1 CR2 + 2,812.3 C g ^ . 9 (5-6)
The indicated positive relationship between net sales 
and CgQ^ is inconsistent with the anticipated inverse re­
lationship, which was confirmed in equation (5-5). This 
inconsistency, which is apparently similar to that exhibited 
by ^NM2  ^ e9uati°n (5-5), may also be the result of a lack 
of independence between the price concepts for savings bonds 
(discussed later). As shown in Table 5-4, the addition of 
Csd2 as t*le second independent variable significantly aids 
Cj^ 2 by accounting for 27.7 per cent of the fluctuations in
9
Annual net sales are measured in millions of dollars; 
C^2 and Cgj)2 » Per cent (two decimals).
The difference in the intercepts for equations (5-5) 
and (5-6) can be explained primarily by the inclusion and
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net sales that were not accounted for (43.3 per cent) by
C„ alone.
2
Disregarding the unexpected relationship between net 
sales and the second Independent variable in both estimates 
of net sales /equations (5-5) and (5-6/7, aPPears to
be a better second determinant than Cgj^* For example, as 
the second independent variable, cnH2  ^accounts f°r 64.9 
per cent of the variations left unaccounted for (43.5 per 
cent) by ^SD2 accounts f°r only 27.7 per cent.
Similarly, the estimate of net sales summarized by equation 
(5-5) is preferred to that indicated by equation (5-6).
That is, with a standard error of $513 (millions), equation 
(5-5) accounts for 93.8 per cent of the total variations in 
net sales; with a larger standard error of $1,070 (millions), 
equation (5-6) accounts for only 68.6 per cent. (See Table 
5-4.)
A Digression on the Grouping of Savings Bonds 
The striking differences between the estimates of the 
demand for group II bonds /equations (5-5) and (5-6/7 and 
and the best estimate of the demand for group 1 bonds
omission of the income variable (DI). For example, if the 
average value of DI during the postwar period is substituted 
into equation (5-5), its intercept is increased from -44,601 
to -5,124.
/equation ( 5 - 4 apparently confirm the premise that the 
grouping of savings bonds according to similar character­
istics is valid, even though no estimate of the demand for 
all savings bonds is available for comparison. Whether the 
grouping of savings bonds utilized is better than any other 
type of grouping is unanswerable. It has been pointed out, 
however, that the bonds within each group are not completely 
homogeneous with respect to denominations and type (discount- 
appreciation or current-income). It is possible that some 
unknown part of the differences between the estimates of 
demand for the two groups might be attributed to the lack of 
homogeneity of type among bonds within a group. However, the 
lack of homogeneity with respect to denomination appears more 
significant. In fact, the lack of homogeneity among bonds 
within group I with respect to denomination may explain most 
of the differences between the estimates of demand for the 
two groups.
During the postwar period, savings bonds were sold in 
a wide variety of denominations. However, as indicated pre­
viously, a bond-denomination-range parameter emerges from 
separate analysis of groups I and II bonds; this range was 
perhaps $25 to $1,000 for group I and $500 or more for 
group II. Since decisions to purchase and redeem savings 
bonds are likely to be made on a more rational basis the
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higher the denomination of the security, the greater homo­
geneity among group II bonds with respect to the bond- 
denomination-range undoubtedly contributed greatly to the 
better estimates for this group.
If this is correct, series H bonds, which possess a 
minimum denomination of $500, could possibly have been 
placed into group II instead of group I. In this case, 
series E bonds would have stood alone, with all of the 
other savings bonds placed in a second group. It seems 
reasonable to expect that the estimates of the demand for 
this new group II would be at least as good as, and per­
haps slightly better than, those actually obtained for 
group II in this study. Since the sale of J and K bonds 
was discounted early in 1957, net sales of group II bonds 
after this date were necessarily negative as only redemp­
tions could take place. If group II had consisted of series 
H bonds, too, its net sales function would have been more 
uniform in that the combined effects of gross sales and 
redemptions would have been measured throughout, rather than 
during only a part of the postwar period. For this reason, 
the estimates of demand for a group II which included series 
H bonds would perhaps be slightly better than those actually 
obtained for group II in this study. On the other hand, the 
estimates of the demand for series E bonds--in comparison
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to those actually obtained for group I--might well have 
been inferior. In comparison to group I, of course, series 
E bonds would have had a narrower bond-denomination-range. 
While a narrower range would have contributed to greater 
homogeneity with respect to denomination, the degree to 
which decisions to purchase and redeem savings bonds are 
likely to have been made on a more rational basis would 
have been reduced. Therefore, it is possible that greater 
homogeneity, but fewer rational decisions, could lead to 
estimates of the demand for E bonds which would be in­
ferior to those actually obtained for group I. Thus, there 
appears to be little to gain in the overall results by 
placing series H bonds in group II rather than In group I.
If this analysis is correct, future empirical studies 
of the demand for savings bonds may provide better overall 
results than this study did if three groups of bonds--E 
bonds in denominations of $200 or less, E and H bonds in 
denominations of $500 or less, and group II bonds^--are 
analyzed. Currently, however, annual net sales of E bonds
During the postwar period, no savings bonds with 
denominations in excess of $200 but less than $500 were sold. 
Nevertheless, in his study, George Hanc indicated that group 
I (series E and H bonds) might be subdivided or subclassi­
fied on the basis of denominations of $100 or less and 
denominations of $200 or more. See George Hanc, o£. cit., 
p. 55.
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in denominations of $200 or less or 
$500 or more are not available.
denominations of
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Ten series of savings bonds have been sold since Che 
inception of the program in 1935. All savings bonds were 
similar in that they were registered and nonmarketable, 
thus providing purchasers virtually riskless investments. 
Although all savings bonds were highly liquid and interest 
yielding, those series of bonds designed primarily for 
individuals with small financial resources were more at­
tractive with respect to these features. After several 
years of difficulty with bonds designed to appeal to non­
individual investors with large financial resources, the 
sale of these series was discontinued.
The encouragement of individual thrift and the pro­
motion of a widespread distribution of the ownership of 
the public debt were two primary objectives of the pro­
gram from its inception through 1963. During the Second 
World War, and thereafter, minimizing the Treasury's 
"residual" borrowing from the commercial banking system 
became an additional and highly important objective of the 
program. Indeed, the characteristics of savings bonds 
and the continuing objectives of the program indicate
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that the Treasury relied upon the sale of savings bonds 
primarily as a means of borrowing directly from indivi­
duals , perhaps especially from individuals with small 
financial resources.
The Role of Savings Bonds in Treasury Borrowing
In borrowing directly from individuals, the Treasury 
placed itself in competition with the financial inter­
mediaries. Furthermore, it depended upon the intermedi­
aries in selling the savings bonds, except to the extent 
that it introduced the payroll savings plan to tap funds 
from individuals with small financial resources. Particu­
larly in regards to the payroll savings plan, the Treasury 
may have succeeded in widening the distribution of the 
ownership of the public debt.
Registered and nonmarketable savings bonds were per­
haps essential in promoting a widespread distribution of 
the ownership of the public debt and in borrowing directly 
from individuals. However, since savings bonds were also 
made redeemable for cash virtually at any time with little 
or no notice, they were highly liquid assets. Initial 
success in promoting a widespread distribution of the 
ownership of highly liquid public debt, therefore, depended 
upon the willingness and/or the ability of the Treasury to 
adopt an attractive fixed yield structure for savings bonds.
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Continuing success of the program, on the other hand, de­
pended upon the willingness and/or the ability of the 
Treasury to maintain--in spite of a fixed yield structure 
for savings bonds--the attractiveness of yields for savings 
bonds in comparison to alternative assets.
In an environment in which interest rates are rela­
tively stable, a fixed yield structure on savings bonds 
might enable the Treasury to both attract a large number 
of long-term lenders and inhibit redemptions of outstanding 
bonds prior to maturity, but the cost to the Treasury could 
be quite high. The reason for this, of course, is that 
the Treasury must fix the yield structure on its savings 
bonds sufficiently high to insure the attractiveness of 
these securities vis-a-vis competing outlets for funds.
In general, the Treasury cannot ignore its financing costs 
and is under pressure to minimize them. Even worse, when 
economic conditions are relatively unstable, frequent 
changes in yields on savings bonds are required if the 
Treasury is to attract long-term lenders and inhibit early 
redemptions. Yet, the frequency of changes in yields on 
nonmarketable issues are clearly limited by institutional 
restraints.
Frequent changes in yield structures for savings bonds 
were unnecessary from the inception of the program to the
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end of Che first phase of Che postwar period (1950). In 
fact, during this period only one change in yield structure 
was made--when E bonds were substituted for D bonds early 
in 1941. Within the environment of generally stable and 
low yields on alternative investments, the prevailing yield 
structures provided a "premium" in maturity yield and a 
"penalty" for early redemption and allowed the Treasury to 
expand the role of savings bonds in its borrowing. Thus, 
the program became an important source of cash receipts for 
the Treasury.
In particular, it provided $3,489 million of net cash 
receipts during the period of origin (March 1, 1935 to April 
30, 1941); $44,529 million during the expansionary period 
(May 1, 1941 to December 31, 1946); and $4,685 million dur­
ing the first phase of the postwar period (calendar years 
1947-50). In spite of increased liquidations, which began 
towards the end of the Second World War, cash receipts 
from the program also contributed to the achievement of the 
debt management objective of retiring marketable debt be­
tween February, 1946 and mid-1949. By the end of 1950, 
therefore, the role of savings bonds in Treasury borrowing 
reached its summit when outstanding savings bonds of $58,019 
million represented 22.6 per cent of the national debt.
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After the accord, the economic environment changed to 
one of generally rising, but flexible yields on alternative 
Investments. In response to these developments, the Treasury 
raised the structure of yields on certain series of savings 
bonds on three occasions--1952, 1957, and 1959. These 
boosts, however, were not of a sufficient magnitude and 
reflected the Inability and/or unwillingness of the Treasury 
to adapt sufficiently to the changing conditions. In spite 
of these changes in yields, the savings bond program re­
sulted in annual net cash drains for the Treasury from the 
accord to the end of 1963. Outstanding savings bonds de­
clined to $48,827 million by the end of that year, and the 
Treasury experienced a cumulative net cash drain of $25,602 
million from 1951 to 1963. As a percentage of the national 
debt, holdings of savings bonds declined (from 22.6 per 
cent) to 15.8 per cent. Not only was this lack of success 
significant in itself, but undoubtedly broader monetary and 
debt management policies were adversely affected by these 
developments in the savings bond program.
In an attempt to explain the decline in the net sales 
of savings bonds during calendar years 1947-63, the demand 
for these bonds, by groups, was analyzed. A comparison of 
the estimates of annual net sales for the two groups 
/equations (5-4), (5-5), and (5-6^7 provides some meaningful
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Insights into the factors determining the postwar demand 
for savings bonds. For example, the estimates point out 
the greater sensitivity of group II bondholders to changes 
In interest rates. The better estimates of annual net 
sales for group II bonds also suggest that group I bond­
holders may be influenced more by non-economic factors, such 
as advertisements appealing to patriotism.
Nevertheless, neither the multiple determinant esti­
mates of the demand for group II bonds nor the best single 
determinant estimate of the demand for group I bonds is 
completely satisfactory. In fact, both leave a great deal 
of the causal forces unexplained. It apppars that the 
biggest shortcomings of this attempt to explain the demand 
for savings bonds stem from the lack of independent price 
determinants for net sales and an adequate approximation of 
the income determinant for savings bonds.
The choice of net sales as the dependent variable was 
a necessary evil, however. Independent price concepts for 
gross sales and redemptions could not be defined. On the 
other hand, single (composite) proxy prices for a net sales 
demand function could not be calculated since the problem of 
assessing relative weights to reasonably independent price 
concepts defined for gross sales and redemptions could not 
be resolved. Therefore, a net sales demand function was
145
adopted, and price concepts defined for gross sales and 
redemptions were considered as possible proxies for the 
price of savings bonds. That Is, C ^ ,  CR , and CgD were 
considered possible proxies for the price of savings bonds 
in the multiple determinant analysis of net sales.
For group I bonds during the postwar period, this ap­
proach was most unsatisfactory empirically--only was 
found to be a single determinant of net sales. Although 
all three measures of were significantly correlated 
with net sales at the 95 per cent level of confidence, even 
the best single determinant estimator of net sales 
did not provide sufficient evidence to classify group I 
bondholders as short-term lenders. The classification of 
these bondholders on the basis of the best estimator among 
the single Cj^ measures appears highly precarious, since 
the best estimator among the single measures was not
also found to be a significant multiple determinant of the 
net sales of group 11 bonds.
In treating CR , Cj^, and CgD as possible determinants 
of net sales for group II bonds, on the other hand, the 
results of the estimates of demand were more satisfactory. 
However, in both estimates of net sales /equations (5-5) and 
(5-627, the relationship between net sales and the second 
independent price (either or ^SD  ^ was i-ncons*-stent
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with the anticipated relationship, which had been confirmed 
by the simple regression analysis. Of course, both of these 
price concepts were developed from the purchasers1 point of 
view, whereas the first independent price (Cr^) was developed 
from the redeemers' point of view. To the extent that these 
two viewpoints did not provide independent price measures, 
the use of C r , Cp^, and Cgj) as reasonably independent price 
concepts for net sales undoubtedly contributed greatly to 
the inconsistent result for the second independent determi­
nant in each estimate of net sales.
If this inconsistency can be disregarded, the better 
estimate of net sales for group II bonds is summarized by 
equation (5-5).1 Since CR2 and CSD2 were signifi­
cant multiple determinants of net sales, group II bond­
holders could be classified as intermediate- or long-term 
lenders who are responsive to changes in opportunity costs 
as measured by interest rate differentials. The greater 
sensitivity of these bondholders to interest rate differen­
tials undoubtedly justifies the Treasury's rationale in 
discontinuing the sale of J and K bonds early in 1957.
■^If this inconsistency is not disregarded, the best 
estimate of net sales for group II bonds must be selected 
from the significant single determinants--either Cn m 21»
CnM22» or Cr 2- ®ee Tflble 5-2.
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Of the five multiple determinants originally proposed 
for the demand function, it was anticipated that both the 
income determinant and the additional income variable would 
not be significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence.
In fact, the additional income variable was proposed because 
a single income determinant was considered inadequate. Even 
with the additional income variable, both measures appeared 
to be inferior approximations of the income determinant. 
Perhaps a major reason for this is that the secular trend 
within each measure had to be eliminated in order to avoid 
spurious correlation.
Surprisingly, however, one measure of the income deter­
minant (DI) was significantly correlated with the net sales 
of group II bonds in the multiple determinant analysis.
Since DI is real disposable income in each year expressed 
as a proportion of its secular trend value, the economic 
significance of this measure of the income determinant in 
equation (5-5) is not clear, at least to the writer. There­
fore, the reliance that should be placed on the absolute 
size of the calculated income coefficient of elasticity 
(Table 5-5) is also somewhat nebulous. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the price elasticities of demand were ten times 
larger than the income coefficient of elasticity appears 
to be significant. That is, interest rate differentials
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were more important than income as a determinant of demand. 
For group I bonds also, greater importance of interest rate 
differentials in comparison to income is perhaps indicated 
by the significance of every measure of Cj^ as a determi- 
nant of net sales. A visual study of the fluctuations in 
redemptions of E bonds (by denomination within a year from 
their date of purchase) appears to indicate that changes in 
interest rates may be more helpful in explaining the fluctu­
ations in redemptions than income. Due to the dominance of 
E bonds in group I, the redemption data of E bonds may be 
used to imply a greater importance of interest rate differ­
entials in comparison to income for group I bonds also.
In summary, this preliminary study of the demand for 
savings bonds by groups during the postwar period appears 
to have its greatest value in providing insights into the 
formulation of further studies. Until the data become 
available to allow the inclusion of a bond denomination 
variable, however, it would seem that the minor changes 
that could be made in the grouping of bonds probably would 
not provide any significant improvements in the overall re­
sults. If price concepts for gross sales and redemptions 
could be measured so that more independence existed between 
them, gross sales and redemptions, rather than net sales, 
could be considered as the dependent variables. In order to
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avoid the need to construct composite prices, which would 
combine independent price concepts for gross sales and re­
demptions into appropriate proxies for net sales, estimates 
of demand might be improved by taking the difference between 
a gross sales function and a redemptions function. Fur­
thermore, it might be useful in future studies to exclude 
the period of time between the end of the Second World War 
and the Accord and to concentrate on the period following 
the return to "free" financial markets in 1951. With a 
shorter time period, perhaps quarterly, rather than annual, 
data might be used; however, some difficulty might be ex­
perienced in obtaining quarterly data for the returns paid 
to shareholders or depositors by financial intermediaries.
Yet, this preliminary study does provide some empirical 
guidelines in estimating the demand for savings bonds during 
the postwar period. For group I bonds, all three estimates 
of annual net sales with could be used. (See Table
5-2.) However, with a standard error of $463 (million), 
equation (5-5) summarizes the best estimate of demand.
Since measures the differential between the average
return on short-term (9-12 months) marketable government 
securities and the yield on new issues of E bonds held for 
a time-holding-period of one year, negative annual net 
sales of group I bonds can be expected (19 times out of 20)
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when this yield differential exceeds 0.50 percentage points. 
At this time, of course, the better estimates of net sales 
for group II bonds are of historical importance only, since 
the sale of J and K bonds was discontinued early in 1957.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE A-1.--Original Schedules of Redemption Values of
$100 Maturity Value Savings Bonds for Series A-D,
E, F, and G Bonds
(Values during each half-year period after the issue 
date in dollars)
Period after 
issue date
/Year(s/7
Series
A-D
Series E 
(1941)
Series F 
(1941)
Series G 
(1941)
First 1/2 75 75.00 »  w »  •  w
1/2 - 1 75 75.00 74.00 98.80
1 - 1 1 / 2 76 75.50 74.20 97.80
1 1 / 2 - 2 77 76.00 74. 50 96.90
2 - 2  1/2 78 76.50 74.90 96.20
2 1 / 2 - 3 79 77.00 75.40 95.60
3 - 3  1/2 80 78.00 76.00 95.10
3 1 / 2 - 4 81 79.00 76.70 94.80
4 - 4  1/2 82 80.00 77.60 94.70
4 1 / 2 - 5 83 81.00 78.60 94. 70
5 - 5  1/2 84 82.00 79. 70 94.90
5 1 / 2 - 6 85 83.00 80.90 95.20
6 - 6  1/2 86 84.00 82. 20 95. 50
6 1 / 2 - 7 87 86.00 83. 50 95.80
7 - 7  1/2 88 88.00 84.80 96.10
7 1 / 2 - 8 90 90.00 86.10 96.40
8 - 8  1/2 92 92.00 87.40 96.70
8 1 / 2 - 9 94 94.00 88.70 97.00
9 - 9  1/2 96 96.00 90.00 97. 30
9 1/2 - 10 98 98.00 91.40 97.60
Maturity (10) 100 100.00 --- ---
10 - 10 1/2 ------- ------- 92.90 97.90
10 1/2 - 11 ------- ------- 94. 50 98.20
11 - 11 1/2 ------- ------- 96.20 98.60
11 1/2 - 12 ------- ------- 98.00 99.20
Maturity (12) »  —  — 100.00 100.00
Source: Series A-D bond data from U. S., Annual Report
of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Fi­
nances for Fiscal Year Ended 1940, p. 61; for E - 1941 
bonds, ibid,, 1941, p. 308; for F - 1941 bonds, ibid., p. 
313; for G - bonds, ibid., p. 314.
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TABLE A-2.--Original Schedules of Yields Realized on
$100 Maturity Value Savings Bonds for Series A-D,
E, F, and G Bonds
(Realized yields to the beginning of the half-year 
periods in per cent)
Period after 
issue date 
/ Y e a r ( s ) J
Series
A-D
Series E 
(1941)
Series F 
(1941)
Series G 
(1941)
First 1/2 tm •
1/2 - 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 10
1 - 1 1 / 2 1.33 0.67 0.27 0.30
1 1 / 2 - 2 1. 76 0.88 0.45 0.44
2 - 2  1/2 1.97 0.99 0.61 0.61
2 1 / 2 - 3 2.09 1.06 0. 75 0.75
3 - 3  1/2 2.16 1.31 0.89 0.88
3 1 / 2 - 4 2.21 1.49 1.03 1.04
4 - 4  1/2 2. 24 1.62 1.19 1.20
4 1 / 2 - 5 2.26 1.72 1.34 1.35
5 - 5  1/2 2.28 1.79 1.49 1. 51
5 1 / 2 - 6 2.29 1.85 1.63 1.66
6 - 6  1/2 2. 29 1.90 1.76 1.79
6 1 / 2 - 7 2.30 2.12 1.87 1.89
7 - 7  1/2 2.30 2.30 1.96 1.98
7 1 / 2 - 8 2.45 2.45 2.03 2.05
8 - 8  1/2 2.57 2.57 2.09 2.12
8 1 / 2 - 9 2.67 2.67 2. 14 2.18
9 - 9  1/2 2.76 2.76 2.19 2. 23
9 1/2 - 10 2.84 2.84 2.24 2. 27
Maturity (10) 2.90 2.90 -  -
10 - 10 1/2 -- 2. 29 2. 31
10 1/2 - 11 - - 2.34 2.35
11 - 11 1/2 - - — 2.40 2.39
11 1/2 - 12 - - mm w 2.46 2.44
Maturity (12) •  * —  •* 2. 53 2. 50
Source: Same as Table A-l.
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TABLE A-3.-- Original Schedules of Prospective Yields to
Maturity on Savings Bonds not Redeemed prior to
Maturity for Series A-D, E, F, and G Bonds
(Prospective yields from the beginning of the half- 
year periods to maturity in per cent)
Period after 
issue date
/Year(s27
Series
A-D
Series E 
(1941)
Series F 
(1941)
Series G 
(1941)
First 1/2 2.90 2.90 2.53 2.50
1/2 - 1 3.05 3.05 2.64 2.62
1 - 1 1 / 2 3.07 3.15 2.73 2.73
1 1 / 2 - 2 3.10 3.25 2.82 2.84
2 - 2  1/2 3.13 3.38 2.91 2.94
2 1 / 2 - 3 3. 17 3.52 2.99 3.04
3 - 3  1/2 3.21 3.58 3.07 3.13
3 1/2 - 4 3.27 3.66 3. 15 3.20
4 - 4  1/2 3.34 3.75 3.20 3.26
4 1 / 2 - 5 3.42 3.87 3.24 3.30
5 - 5  1/2 3.52 4.01 3.27 3.32
5 1 / 2 - 6 3.64 4.18 3.29 3.33
6 - 6  1/2 3.81 4.41 3.29 3.33
6 1 / 2 - 7 4.02 4.36 3.31 3.34
7 - 7  1/2 4. 31 4.31 3.32 3.35
7 1 / 2 - 8 4.26 4.26 3.35 3.37
8 - 8  1/2 4.21 4.21 3.40 3. 39
8 1 / 2 - 9 4. 17 4.17 3.46 3.42
9 - 9  1/2 4. 12 4. 12 3.54 3.42
9 1/2 - 10 4.08 4.08 3.63 3.51
Maturity (10) — -  -
10 - 10 1/2 3. 72 3.60
10 1/2 - 11 — — 3.81 3. 75
11 - 11 1/2 - - — 3.91 3.94
11 1/2 - 12 4.08 4.13
Maturity (12) *  “ * “ — • —  —
Source: Same as Table A-l.
TABLE A-4.--Average Yields on Marketable Government Securities and Average Yields 
Earned on Shares or Deposits in Insured, Private Financial Intermediaries, by
Calendar Years, 1934-41
(Yields in per cent)
Government obliga tions Private financial institutions
Calendar
year
Bills^1^
(New
issues)
Notes 
(3-5 yrs.) 
Tax-exempt
B o n d s ^  
Partially 
Tax-exempt
Savings & 
loan 
shares
Mutual
savings
deposits
Commer­
cial bank 
deposits
1934 0.256 2.12 3.12 4.07 2.57 2.40
1935 0.137 1. 29 2.79 3.93 2.26 2.01
1936 0.143 1.11 2.69 3.84 1.96 1.72
1937 0.447 1.40 2.74 3.84 1.92 1.62
1938 0.053 0.83 2.61 3.81 1.91 1.55
1939 0.023 0.59 2.41 3.78 1.88 1.43
1940 0.014 0.50 2.26 3.63 1.73 1.30
1941 0.103 0.46 2.05 3.56 1.66 1.20
TABLE A-4 (cont.)
Source: Average yields on government obligations from Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve Bulletin, XXXI (May, 1945), 483; average yields earned on shares 
in insured savings and loan associations from Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the 
United States (Princeton, N. J., 1955), Vol. 1, p. 447; average yields earned on 
deposits in insured mutual savings banks for 1934, U. S., Annual Report of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for Year Ending December 31. 1934, p* 243 
and for years 1935-41, ibid. 1941. p. 59; average yields earned on time and sav­
ings deposits in insured commercial banks, ibid. 1942, p. 38.
(1) Tax-exempt prior to March 1, 1941 and including the following 
maturities: three months, to February 16, 1934; six months, from February 23,
1934 to February 23, 1935; nine months, from March 1, 1935 to October 15, 1937; 
bills maturing about March 16, 1938 from October 22 to December 10, 1937; three 
months, from December 17, 1937 to date.
(2) Average of yields on all outstanding, partially tax-exempt government 
bonds due or callable after twelve years for 1934; and after 15 years, from 1935 
to date.
15?
CHART A-l.--Yields on Bonds, by Time-holding-period and Issue
Per
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Source: Realized and prospective yields on all savings
bonds except E-1959 are from Treasury Bulletin (May, 1957), 
pp. A-8 and A-9; for E-1959, ibid. (October, 1959), p. A-4.
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TABLE B-l.--Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of Group I Bonds, by Calendar
Years, 1941-63 
(Millions of dollars)
Calendar
year
Gross sales V Redemptions 2/
Net sales
Proportions of
(Issue price) 4/
(Issue price plus 
accrued discount) kj
reaempt 
gross £ 
(Pei
:ions to 
sales 
cent)_
Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative
1941 1,145 1,145 11 11 1,134 1 1
1942 5,989 7,134 209 220 5,780 3 3
1943 10,344 17,478 1,380 1,600 8,964 13 9
1944 12,380 29,858 3,005 4,605 9,375 24 15
1945 9,822 39,680 4,963 9,568 4,859 51 24
1946 4,466 44,146 5,423 14,991 -947 121 34
1947 4,085 48,231 3,930 18,921 155 96 39
1948 4,224 52,445 3,728 22,649 496 88 43
1949 4,208 56,663 3,448 26,097 760 82 46
1950 3,668 60,331 3,912 30,009 -244 107 50
1951 3,190 63,521 4,036 34,045 -846 127 54
1952 3,575 67,096 4,098 38,143 -523 115 57
1953 4,368 71,464 4,157 42,300 211 95 59
1954 4,889 76,353 4,444 46,744 445 91 61
1955 5,368 81,721 4,652 51,396 716 87 63
TABLE B-l (coat.)
Calendar
year
Gross sales Redemptions 2/ 3/
Net sales
Proportions of
redemptions to
gross sales x 
(Per cent)(Issue price) 4/
(Issue price plus 
accrued discount) 4/
Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative
1956 5,043 86,764 4,832 56,228 216 96 65
1957 4,507 91,271 5,469 61,697 -962 121 68
1958 4,689 95,960 4,856 66,553 -167 104 69
1959 4,320 100,280 5,519 72,072 -1,199 128 72
1960 4,350 104,630 4,996 77,068 -646 115 74
1961 4,539 109,169 4,484 81,552 55 99 75
1962 4,278 113,447 4,636 86,188 -358 108 76
1963 4,760 118,207 4,557 90,745 203 96 77
1947-50 ... ___ 1,167 - - —
1951-63 ... ... --- —  J -2,860 -- --
1947-63 - - — • “ “ • — ■ , -1,693 “ * ——
Source: Savings bond data for 1941 to 1947 from U. S., Office of the Secretary,
Treasury Bulletin (March, 1948), p. 25; data for 1948 to 1952, ibid. (December, 1953), 
p. 20; data for 1953 to 1957, ibid (December, 1958), p. 38; data for 1958 to 1963, 
ibid. (December, 1964), p. 65.
TABLE B-l (cont.)
Note: Net sales, cumulations and percentages are calculated from the original
data; net sales are gross sales at issue price minus redemptions at issue price plus 
accrued discount.
1/ Beginning June 1947, series E gross sales include small amounts of unclassi­
fied sales consisting of series E, F, and G bonds.
2/ Series E redemptions include small amounts of unclassified series A-D redemp­
tions beginning October 1944 and small amounts of unclassified F and G redemptions, 
beginning June 1947.
3/ Includes both matured and unmatured bonds until March 1961.
4/ Sales and redemption figures include exchanges of minor amounts of (1) 
matured series E bonds for series G and K bonds from May 1951 through April 1957 
and (2) F and J bonds for series H bonds beginning January 1960; however, they 
exclude exchanges of series E bonds for series H bonds.
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
-Gross Sales, Redemptions, and Net Sales of Group II Bonds, by Calendar
Years, 1941-63 
(Millions of dollars)
Gross sales _1/ V Redemptions 2/ 3/ 4/
Net sales
Proportions of 
redemptions to
(Issue price)
(Issue price plus 
accrued discount)
gross sa 
(Per c
les
ent)
Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative
1,393 1,393 2 2 1,391
3,168 4,561 36 38 3,132 1 1
3,385 7,946 124 162 3,261 4 2
3,664 11,610 258 420 3,406 7 4
3,115 14,725 370 790 2,745 12 5
2,962 17,687 615 ,1,405 2,347 21 8
2,609 20,296 715 2,120 1,894 27 10
3,071 23,367 840 2,960 2,231 27 13
1,626 24,993 815 3,775 811 50 15
2,406 27,399 905 4,680 1,501 38 17
770 28,169 1,093 5,773 -323 142 20
586 28,755 929 6,702 -343 158 23
432 29,187 1,968 8,670 -1,536 456 30
1,284 30,471 2,526 11,196 -1,242 197 37
907 31,378 2,636 13,832 -1,729 291 44
O'
TABLE B-2 (cont. )
Calendar
year
Gross sales 1/ 4/ Redemptions 2/ 31 4/
Net sales
Proportions of
redemptions to
gross sales 
(Per cent)(Issue price)
(Issue price plus 
accrued discount)
Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative Yearly Cumulative
1956 475 31,853 3,422 17,254 -2,947 720 54
1957 98 31,951 4,153 21,407 -4,055 ■* 67
1958 --------------- 31,951 2,395 23,802 -2,395 -- 74
1959 — 31,951 3>2A6c I*L27,048 -3,246 -- 85
1960 — 31,951 1,7325/61 28,780 -1,732 - - 90
1961 — 31,951 1,1086/71 29,888 -1,108 Mi * 94
1962 — 31,951 96315 30,851 -963 -- 97
1963 — 31,951 462-^ 31,313 -462 •  ^ 98
1947-50 _  _ — _  —  — *  —  - 6,437 *  - —
1951-63 — . . . --------------- . . . -22,081 »  tm --
1947-63 ——— —  —  — ™ — -15,644 ** * ™
Source: Savings bond data for 1941 to 1947 from Treasury Bulletin (March, 1948),
p. 26; data for 1948 to 1952, ibid. (December, 1953), p. 20; data for 1953 to 1957, 
ibid. (December, 1958), p. 38; data for 1958 to 1963, ibid. (December, 1964), p. 65.
TABLE B-2 (cont.)
Note: Net sales, cumulations and percentages are calculated from the original
data; net sales are gross sales at issue price minus redemptions at issue price plus 
accrued discount.
1/ Beginning June 1947, group II gross sales do not include small amounts of 
unclassified sales consisting of series E, F and G bonds.
2/ Beginning June 1947, group II redemptions do not include small amounts of 
unclassified F and G redemptions.
3/ Includes both matured and unmatured bonds until March 1961.
4/ Sales and redemption figures include exchanges of minor amounts of (1)
matured series E bonds for series G and K bonds from May 1951 through April 1957
and (2) series F and J bonds for series H bonds beginning January, 1960.
5/ Includes exchanges of series 1948 F and G bonds for 4-3/4 % marketable
notes of 1964.
6/ Includes exchanges of series 1949 F and G bonds for 4 % marketable bonds 
of 1969.
]_f Includes exchanges of series 1950 F and G bonds for 3-7/8 % marketable 
bonds of 1968.
&/ Includes exchanges of series 1951 and 1952 F and G bonds for 3-7/8 % 
marketable bonds of 1971 and 4 % of marketable bonds 1980.
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A SINGLE PRICE DETERMINANT ESTIMATE OF
GROSS SALES OF GROUPS I AND II BONDS
With annual gross sales rather than net sales as the
dependent variable, the Cjjjj regressions were repeated in
order to determine whether C._, was a determinant of gross
N M
sales of group I bonds during the entire postwar period and
of group II bonds during calendar years 1947-56.
For group I bonds, the anticipated inverse relation­
ship between gross sales and each was confirmed in all
cases but one--gross sales with Surprisingly, per­
haps, no CnM jj was significant. With c n m 12’ and
^NM^3 » resPectively, the simple coefficients of correlation 
are -0.214, +0.214, and -0.177.
The anticipated inverse relationship between gross 
sales of group II bonds and each was confirmed also.
Furthermore, unlike the results of the regressions for group 
I bonds, an<* ^NM22 were significant. The results
of these tests are summarized in Table C-l. For the rela­
tionship between gross sales and which was not found
to be significant, the simple coefficient of correlation is 
-0.206.
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TABLE C-l.--Significant Regression Equations, Coefficients
of Correlation and Standard Errors of Estimate for Group
II Bonds, Calendar Years 1947-56
Regression Equations
Coefficient
of
correlation
(R)
Standard error of 
estimate (sg) 
(Millions of 
dollars)
Annual gross sales,
1947-56(1* - 152 -
1,181.5 Cpjj^. -0.778 755
Annual gross sales, 
1947-56(1) -
1,277 - 3,575.6
cn m 21* -0.727 702
(1) Annual gross sales are measured in millions of 
dollars; CnM2 }> in per cent (two decimals). Cnm22 *-s 
measured by tne differential between the average yield on 
short-term (9-12 months) marketable government securities 
and the maturity yield on new issues of series F and J 
bonds. CflM2i *-s measured by the differential between the 
average yield on long-term (ten years or more) marketable 
government securities and the maturity yield on new issues 
of F and J bonds.
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These results are of considerable interest In that they 
tend to point out the Treasury's rationale for dropping the 
sale of J and K bonds early in 1957. The greater sensitivity 
to interest rate differentials among group II bondholders is 
clearly indicated by the significance of the two regressions 
for calendar years 1947-56. On the other hand, no was
significant for group I bonds during the entire postwar 
period.^- Therefore, appears to be a determinant of
gross sales for group II bonds, but not for group I bonds.
As apparent determinants of net sales, but not of gross 
sales, must be highly correlated with the redemptions
of group I bonds. That is to say, if the fluctuations in 
redemptions can be shown to have dominated those of net 
sales, the significant relationships obtained for net sales 
with indicate that the measurements of Cj^ probably are
not independent of the proposed measurement of the price con­
cept of Cr ,^ which is based on the redeemers' point of view.
In determining whether the fluctuations in either gross 
sales or redemptions dominated the fluctuations in net sales 
for group I bonds, the linear secular trends of all three
^Marketable government securities, it might be noted, 
might have been better alternative investments for group II 
bondholders than for holders of group I bonds.
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were considered. It appears that redemptions, rather than 
gross sales, dla In fact dominate net sales during the post­
war period. The linear secular trends, of course, indicate 
a negative slope for net sales, but positive slopes for gross 
sales and redemptions.
It is to be recalled that was shown to be an ap­
parent determinant of net sales of group II bonds during 
the entire postwar period as well as gross sales during cal­
endar years 1947-56. Because of these results, one would 
suppose that gross sales should have dominated net sales.
An attempt was made to determine whether the fluctuations in 
net sales were actually dominated by those of gross sales. 
Prior to the accord, this appears (visually) to be the case; 
since the accord, however, redemptions appear to have been 
dominant. Unlike the case of group I bonds, the dominance
question for group II bonds is somewhat indeterminate due to
2
the lack of uniformity in time periods.
2
Generally, for the postwar period, the fluctuations in 
redemptions apparently had a greater influence than did 
gross sales on the fluctuations in net sales; of course, 
redemptions and net sales were identical after the discon­
tinuance of the sales of J and K bonds early in 1957.
Quantitatively, the dominance question is somewhat in­
determinate since secular trend analysis could not be used. 
This approach is inapplicable since at least three time 
periods would have to be analyzed--calendar years 1947-50 
for the period prior to the accord; calendar years 1951-56 
for the period after the accord, when both gross sales and
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These results, of course, are not entirely satisfactory. 
However, the criteria used In testing the consistency of the 
results--now, for net sales and gross sales with and 
then later, for net sales and redemptions with Cj^--are too 
rigid If independence between the prices of savings bonds 
did not exist. Evidence of the lack of Independence will be 
shown later. So, perhaps, we are justified in continuing to 
assume that Cj^ Is a determinant of net sales.
A SINGLE PRICE DETERMINANT ESTIMATE OF 
REDEMPTIONS OF GROUPS I AND II BONDS 
With annual redemptions of group I bonds, rather than 
net sales, as the dependent variable, the anticipated in­
verse relationship between and redemptions was confirmed. 
Unlike the results with net sales, Cj^ was significant in 
accounting for the fluctuations in redemptions. In fact, 
a very high coefficient of correlation of -0.919 was obtained. 
The significant regression obtained is summarized in equation 
C-l, and its standard error of estimate is $235 (million).
redemptions took place; and calendar years 1957-63 for the 
remainder of the period, when only redemptions were pos­
sible. These short time periods are not suitable for secu­
lar trend analysis.
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Annual redemptions, 1947-63 ■
3
5,009 - 501.3 CRi> (C-l)
This result, coupled with the fact that redemptions ap­
pear to dominate net sales, makes the lack of significance 
for the regression between annual net sales and CR  ^ (see p. 
118) even more surprising. For example, since redemptions 
of matured E bonds during their extended terms are included 
in redemptions of group I bonds, the significance of the 
regression in equation (C-l) does not indicate that the 
prospective yield to maturity on new issues was an inappro­
priate measure. Nevertheless, CR  ^does not appear to be a 
sufficient proxy variable for net sales in that the derived 
relationship (for net sales with CR )^ was not found to be 
significant according to the F test.
For group II bonds, the anticipated inverse relation­
ship between CR  ^ and annual redemptions was confirmed also. 
With a coefficient of correlation of -0.430, however, the 
relationship was not significant. This result is surprising 
since options for extended terms were not available to these 
bondholders, and the relationship between net sales and CR^
^Annual redemptions are measured in millions of dollars; 
CR  ^ in per cent (two decimals).
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was significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence.
In this case, however, the dominance of the fluctuations in 
annual net sales was considered somewhat indeterminate.
(See footnote 2.) Yet, in comparison with for group 
I bonds, appears to be a better proxy variable for net
sales of group II bonds.
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